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TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY
VERSUS THE COURTS
Robert J. Miller*
Abstract: American Indian reservations are the poorest parts of the United States, and a
higher percentage of Indian families across the country live below the poverty line than any
other ethnic or racial sector. Indian nations and Indian peoples also suffer from the highest
unemployment rates in the country and have the highest substandard housing rates. The vast
majority of the over three hundred Indian reservations and the Alaska Native villages do not
have functioning economies. This lack of economic activity starves tribal governments of the
tax revenues that governments need to function. In response, Indian nations create and operate
business entities to bring jobs and income to Indian Country, improve the standard of living
for their citizens, and earn profits to help fund their governments.
As constitutionally recognized governments, Indian nations possess inherent sovereign
powers, including sovereign immunity wherein they cannot be sued by anyone (except the
United States) or in any court unless the tribe consents. Their sovereign rights, and especially
sovereign immunity, assist Indian nations to be successful and profitable in their economic
endeavors.
In the last few decades, however, state and lower federal courts have interfered with tribal
sovereign decisions and sovereign immunity. These courts have imposed onerous and even
outrageous requirements on tribal governments that violate well-recognized principles of
efficiency, profitability, and common sense. These court decisions are defeating the very
reasons Indian nations operate business concerns. In contrast, the United States and the states
engage in a wide array of economic activities and they benefit from the protections of sovereign
immunity. Those governments operate almost totally free of judicial restraints on how they
establish, manage, and operate their businesses. Indian nations and their legislative and
executive decisions should be treated with the same judicial respect and deference that state
and federal legislative and executive branches receive.
This Article describes and critiques the improper approach many state and lower federal
courts have taken in forcing tribal governments to create, manage, and operate their economic
entities. The Article argues that Indian nations, the U.S. Supreme Court, and Congress should
not tolerate this judicial overreach and infringement on the sovereign rights of Native
governments. The Article briefly lays out four possible strategies Indian nations, Congress,
and the Supreme Court should consider to prevent this judicial activism. The very future of
Indian Country as viable places where Indigenous governments, peoples, and cultures can
survive and thrive is at issue.
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Distinguished Research Scholar; Faculty Director, Rosette LLP American Indian Economic
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Weinstein-Tull, Ilan Wurman, and Joshua Sellers of the Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law for
very helpful comments given during the drafting of this Article.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1999, President Bill Clinton compared American Indian reservations
to “third world countries.”1 In truth, reservations are the poorest parts of
America, and a higher percentage of Indian families all across the country
live below the federal poverty line than any other ethnic or racial group in
the United States.2 Indian nations and Indian peoples nationwide also
suffer from the highest unemployment rates¾as high as 90% on some

1. Brenda Norrell, Clinton’s New Market Focus on Indian Country, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY, May
3, 2000, at A1; Michelle M. Taggart, Challenging the Traditional View of Tribal Economics, AM.
INDIAN REP., Oct. 1999, at 17.
2. E.g., MIRIAM JORGENSEN, NATIVE NATIONS INST., ACCESS TO CAPITAL AND CREDIT IN NATIVE
COMMUNITIES 4 (2016) (stating that from 2006–2010 American Indian poverty rates were 32%
compared to 14% for non-natives); ROBERT J. MILLER, RESERVATION “CAPITALISM”: ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT IN INDIAN COUNTRY 2–4 (2012) (citing numerous authorities); SUZANE MACARTNEY,
ALEMAYEHU BISHAW & KAYLA FONTENOT, U.S. DEP’T OF COM., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POVERTY
RATES FOR SELECTED DETAILED RACE AND HISPANIC GROUPS BY STATE AND PLACE: 2007–2011 2–
3, 13 (2013); Ryan D. Dreveskracht, Native Nation Economic Development via the Implementation
of Solar Projects: How to Make It Work, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 27, 30 n.14 (2011) (noting that the
poverty rates on reservations was 31.6% compared to 13.1% for U.S.).
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reservations¾and the highest substandard housing rates in the country.3
In addition, Indians have the lowest educational attainment levels of any
ethnic or racial group in the United States.4 The vast majority of the
approximately three hundred and thirty Indian reservations in the lower
forty-eight states and Alaska Native communities do not possess fully
functioning economies.5 This lack of economic activity starves tribal
governments of the usual form of governmental funding: income and sales
taxes.6 The economic activities that do occur on most reservations and the
employment opportunities therein are primarily found in tribal and federal
government jobs and in entities that are owned and operated by tribal and
federal governments.7
Due to centuries of colonial and United States misappropriation of
Indian lands and assets, and active ethnic cleansing and even genocide of

3. E.g., Shelly Hagan, Where U.S. Unemployment Is Still Sky-High: Indian Reservations,
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 5, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-04-05/where-u-sunemployment-is-still-sky-high-indian-reservations [https://perma.cc/P8PB-Q3DK]; American
Indian and Alaska Native Heritage Month: November 2015, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Nov. 2, 2015),
https://www.census.gov/newsroom/facts-for-features/2015/cb15-ff22.html [https://perma.cc/6SUMCXRY] (stating that 28.3% of American Indians and Alaska Natives live in poverty compared to the
national rate of 15.5%); U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, OFF. OF THE ASSISTANT SEC’Y-INDIAN AFFS.,
2013
AMERICAN
INDIAN
POPULATION
AND
LABOR
FORCE
REPORT
10–11,
https://www.bia.gov/sites/bia.gov/files/assets/public/pdf/idc1-024782.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3469KYQ9]; Richard Read, With 63% Unemployment, Oregon Tribe Clings to Hope, THE OREGONIAN,
Dec. 5, 2009, at A1; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COM., AMERICAN INDIAN, ALASKA
NATIVE TABLES FROM THE STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2004–2005 441, 451
(124th ed. 2005), https://nmu.edu/nativeamericanstudies/sites/nativeamericanstudies/files/202111/AIANstatabst04-05.pdf [https://perma.cc/8QUS-SEVK]; CMTY. DEV. FIN. INSTS. FUND, U.S.
DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, THE REPORT OF THE NATIVE AMERICAN LENDING STUDY 13–14 (2001),
https://www.cdfifund.gov/sites/cdfi/files/documents/2001_nacta_lending_study.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HKJ3-W95W]; U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URB. DEV., ASSESSMENT OF AMERICAN
INDIAN HOUSING NEEDS AND PROGRAM: FINAL REPORT xii, 66–67, 76–79 (May 1996) (reporting that
Indians have the worst housing problems in the U.S.; 44% of housing in Indian Country is substandard
as compared to 27% in the U.S.).
4. E.g., Raymond Cross, American Indian Education: The Terror of History and the Nation’s Debt
to the Indian Peoples, 21 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 941, 943 (1999); 143 Cong. Rec. S5876–77
(daily ed. June 17, 1997); Ward Churchill & Winona LaDuke, Native North America: The Political
Economy of Radioactive Colonialism, in THE STATE OF NATIVE AMERICA: GENOCIDE,
COLONIZATION, AND RESISTANCE 241, 246 (M. Annette Jaimes ed., 1992) (noting that Indians have
the lowest level of formal education of any group in the United States).
5. Robert J. Miller, Sovereign Resilience: Reviving Private-Sector Economic Institutions in Indian
Country, 2018 BYU L. REV. 1331, 1338 (2018).
6. See Adam Crepelle, Taxes, Theft, and Indian Tribes: Seeking an Equitable Solution to State
Taxation of Indian Country Commerce, 122 W. VA. L. REV. 999, 1020 (2020); see also Matthew L.M.
Fletcher, In Pursuit of Tribal Economic Development as a Substitute for Reservation Tax Revenue,
80 N.D. L. REV. 759, 760 (2004).
7. MILLER, RESERVATION “CAPITALISM”, supra note 2, at 49–55, 138.
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Indians and Indian nations, it is no surprise that “Indian Country”8 lacks
many of the human and financial resources needed to create beneficial
economic conditions on reservations.9 Tribal governments today
desperately look to their own business entities and even their
governmental departments, such as their social welfare and health
programs, as sources of reservation-based employment and tribal
income.10 This is primarily the case, not surprisingly, because tax
revenues are in very short supply for the 574 federally recognized tribal
governments in the United States. Consequently, Indian nations create and
operate tribally owned businesses to try to earn profits in lieu of taxes to
fund their operations, their nation’s economic and social welfare, and to
provide employment and housing in Indian Country.11 These governments
are well aware that their sovereign rights and sovereign immunity assist
them in successfully and profitably operating economic entities.
In the last few decades, however, state and federal courts have begun
interfering with tribal sovereign decisions and the immunity protection all
governments enjoy from being sued in any court unless they consent to
such suits. Many of these courts have also begun imposing economic and
business conditions and requirements on tribal governments that violate
well-recognized norms and principles of economic efficiency and
8. “Indian Country” is a term of art. In general, it defines the areas where tribal governments
primarily exercise their sovereign powers. It is also the area where, for the most part, state authority
and laws do not apply, and where the majority of federal laws regarding Indian affairs apply. Congress
defined the term in 1948 for purposes of criminal law. Pub. L. No. 80-772, § 1151, 62 Stat. 757 (1980)
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1151). The same definition generally applies in the civil law arena. DeCoteau
v. Dist. Cnty. Ct. for the Tenth Jud. Dist., 420 U.S. 425, 428 n.2 (1975). Indian Country generally
includes: (1) all lands within reservation borders; (2) dependent Indian communities (a complex issue
that can include lands not owned by a tribe and even off-reservation lands); and (3) allotments of land
to tribal governments and individual Indians when the land is still held in trust ownership by the
United States. 18 U.S.C. § 1151(a)(1)–(3).
9. MILLER, RESERVATION “CAPITALISM”, supra note 2, at 2–7, 27, 34–36, 40–41, 44–46, 113–14,
135–37. See generally THE STATE OF NATIVE AMERICA, supra note 4.
10. See, e.g., Ron Allen & Ecotrust, Negotiating a Future: Indigenous Leadership Through the
Ages, ECOTRUST, at 39:57–40:20 (Dec. 15, 2021), https://ecotrust.org/negotiating-a-futureindigenous-leadership-through-the-ages/ [https://perma.cc/HJ3B-9T43] (explaining that because his
tribe has only 550 citizens and is thus too small to justify starting a clinic in and for such a small rural
community, the tribe “turned [its] health care clinic into a business” for the region and now serves
17,000 people); Miller, Sovereign Resilience, supra note 5, at 1379–80 & n.199 (describing Tohono
O’otham Nation built a skilled elder housing complex for social welfare reasons but then realized
economic benefits from construction and 100 permanent facility care jobs; Mississippi Choctaw Tribe
opened a 120-bed nursing home that employs 125 people to assist purposely in tribal economic
development); MILLER, RESERVATION “CAPITALISM,” supra note 2, at 49–50, 71–92 (discussing
tribal gaming), 121, 127–29, 137–40; Alyce S. Adams, Andrew J. Lee & Michael Lipsky,
Governmental Services and Programs: Meeting Citizens’ Needs, in REBUILDING NATIVE NATIONS:
STRATEGIES FOR GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT 223, 223–25, 227–39, 241–43 (Miriam
Jorgensen ed., 2007).
11. See Fletcher, supra note 6.
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profitability. These court mandates thus work to defeat the very purpose
of businesses operated by Indian nations to bolster economic strength. In
contrast, the United States and state governments also engage in economic
activities while maintaining sovereign immunity and the ability to
establish and operate their business entities as they determine.
It is vital that Indian nations pursue the goal of improving the living
conditions on reservations to ensure the livability of Indian Country and
to best preserve the existence of the homelands of Indian nations, peoples,
and cultures. These crucial goals will only be met if tribal governments
are allowed to use their sovereign rights to revive and develop their public
and private sector economies and traditional institutions according to their
needs and criteria. The interference of federal and state judges into these
economic affairs hinders Indian nations and Native peoples from serving
those laudable goals. In the procedural and governmental systems in the
United States, judges are ill-equipped to intervene into these decisions.
Courts have little to no expertise in the business world, and do not possess
adequate procedures to hold legislative-type hearings to balance and
determine best policies and practices for governments.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I surveys governmental
sovereign immunity, the exercise of sovereignty, and the protections
federal and state governments enjoy in operating a wide variety of
economic entities and activities. Part II then examines the sovereignty and
sovereign protections Indian nations have enjoyed for over one hundred
years in operating their economic activities. It also analyzes an emerging
and disturbing judicial trend limiting and removing those protections at
the whim of state and federal judges. Part III addresses how state and
federal courts are imposing inefficient and unsound rules on the formation
and the actual operations of businesses created by Indian nations that are
designed to improve economic and social conditions in Indian Country.
Part III also puts forth some initial thoughts on countermeasures that
courts themselves should consider, as well as strategies that Indian nations
and Congress could adopt to resist this judicial trend. This Article
concludes that state and federal courts should not interfere with wellaccepted sovereign and economic principles the judicial branch is illequipped to address. This interference undermines tribal nations’ abilities
to improve their economic conditions. Indian nations and reservation
communities must dramatically improve the living standards on
reservations and create economies that produce adequate wages,
employment, and housing if Indian Country is to remain a viable
homeland for tribal nations and peoples for the generations to come.
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GOVERNMENTAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND
BUSINESS ENTITIES

There is no purely capitalist country in the world.12 Every nation
regulates, manages, and even actively participates in its national economy
to varying extents.13 Likewise, all governments in the United States
manage, regulate, and intervene in their economies via taxation and
legislative policies. In addition, governments take a more active role by
even creating, owning, and operating governmental businesses. These
economic entities compete in the open market with private companies,
even though governments often express valid social and economic policy
justifications for these interventions.
State and federal governments are of course sovereign entities, and they
enjoy the protection of sovereign immunity to safeguard their public
treasuries¾the public fisc¾from lawsuits. The question of state and
federal immunity often arises in litigation. Courts seemingly have little
problem in granting this immunity protection to the operations of these
governmental business entities, their governmental owners, and even for
private contractors who operate these entities for governments.14 I briefly
examine here this economic practice of state and federal governments and
how courts handle state and federal sovereignty and sovereign immunity
when lawsuits arise regarding the operations of these businesses.
A.

Sovereign Immunity

Sovereign immunity is the centuries-old legal principle that you cannot
sue the king in the king’s own court.15 That ancient idea has morphed
12. See, e.g., HARRY SHUTT, THE TROUBLE WITH CAPITALISM 10–13, 66 (1998) (“[T]he
development of capitalist enterprise has always [relied] on significant state intervention.”).
13. E.g., Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, The Size and Sectoral
Distribution of State-Owned Enterprises 7 (2017), https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264280663-en
[https://perma.cc/R8X7-KZ2H] (“State-owned enterprises (SOEs) are important elements of many
national economies.”); Jane Nelson, CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY INITIATIVE: HARVARD KENNEDY
SCHOOL, BUILDING LINKAGES FOR COMPETITIVE AND RESPONSIBLE ENTREPRENEURSHIP: INNOVATE
PARTNERSHIPS TO FOSTER SMALL ENTERPRISE, PROMOTE ECONOMIC GROWTH, AND REDUCE
POVERTY
IN
DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES
3,
12–13
(2006),
https://www.hks.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/centers/mrcbg/programs/cri/files/report_8EXEC_UN
IDO%2Bexecutive%2Bsummary.pdf [https://perma.cc/6DYA-GWMC].
14. See Kate Sablosky Elengold & Jonathan D. Glater, Qualified Sovereignty, 97 WASH. L. REV.
155, 155–56, 162–82 (2022); see also id. at 155 & n.1 (in “early 2008 at least 190,000 contractor
personnel . . . were working on U.S.-funded contracts in the Iraq theater”).
15. See 2 DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, THE LAW OF TORTS 328 (2d
ed. 2011); Hale v. Port of Portland, 308 Or. 508, 513 (1989) (“Sovereign immunity originated in the
rule that the English King could not be sued in his own courts.” (citing 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND,
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today into the principle that a plaintiff cannot sue a government, or any
entity of that government, unless the government has expressly consented
to be sued in a specific court, for that specific type of claim, and for those
specific damages. State, tribal, and federal governments often use
immunity to defend against lawsuits, but they also have often waived their
immunity to be sued in different fora and on specific topics.
Sovereign immunity serves two primary public purposes. First, it
upholds the dignity, or the “dignitary interests” of governments.16 Second,
and most importantly, it protects the public by protecting the public
treasury from private lawsuits that might imperil the financing and
operations of crucial governmental services and programs.17 Sovereign
immunity for Indian nations promotes these same objectives.18
“Sovereign immunity shields the Federal Government and its agencies
from suit” absent an express waiver.19 Thus, the United States is “immune
from suit save as it consents to be sued . . . and the terms of its consent to
be sued in any court define that court’s jurisdiction to entertain the suit.”20
Waivers of federal immunity “must be unequivocally expressed.”21
The Supreme Court has described the breadth of this immunity: “Such
immunity applies ‘however erroneous the act may have been, and
however injurious in its consequences [the act] may have proved to the
plaintiff.’”22 In addition, this immunity also bars a plaintiff from pursuing
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 518 (2d ed. 1898)); Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 414–16 (1979) (“The
immunity of a truly independent sovereign from suit in its own courts has been enjoyed as a matter
of absolute right for centuries.”); Guy I. Seidman, The Origins of Accountability: Everything I Know
About the Sovereign’s Immunity, I Learned from King Henry III, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 393, 426–27
(2005).
16. Maliandi v. Montclair State Univ., 845 F.3d 77, 83 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing Hess v. Port Auth.
Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 52 (1994)) (recognizing that immunity “does not merely shield
state treasuries. Instead, it advances two fundamental goals: safeguarding States’ dignity and
protecting their financial solvency”); see also Fresenius Med. Care Cardiovascular Res., Inc. v. P.R.
& the Caribbean Cardiovascular Ctr. Corp., 322 F.3d 56, 63 (1st Cir. 2003).
17. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 750 (1999) (stating that sovereign immunity protects the
financial integrity of states, many of which “could have been forced into insolvency but for their
immunity from private suits for money damages”); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 674 (1974).
18. Cook v. Avi Casino Enters., Inc., 548 F.3d 718, 725 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Allen v. Gold
Country Casino, 464 F.3d 1044, 1046 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1231 (2007)) (“[T]he
settled law of our circuit is that tribal corporations acting as an arm of the tribe enjoy the same
sovereign immunity granted to a tribe itself.”), cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1221 (2009).
19. FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994); Harger v. Dep’t of Labor, 569 F.3d 898, 903 (9th
Cir. 2009) (quoting Dep’t of the Army v. Blue Fox, Inc. 525 U.S. 255, 260 (1999)).
20. United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976) (quoting United States v. Sherwood, 312
U.S. 584, 586 (1941)).
21. Franconia Assocs. v. United States, 536 U.S. 129, 141 (2002) (quoting United States v. King,
395 U.S. 1, 4 (1969)).
22. Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 199–200 (1985) (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335,
347 (1871)).
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claims for monetary damages against a federal officer or employee if they
were acting within their official capacities.23
State governments also enjoy sovereign immunity. In fact, this
principle was enshrined in the U.S. Constitution in 1795 in the
Eleventh Amendment.24 “Although the text of the Amendment would
appear to restrict only the Article III diversity jurisdiction of the federal
courts, ‘we have understood the Eleventh Amendment to stand not so
much for what it says, but for the presupposition . . . which it confirms.’”25
The “presupposition” the Court referred to “has two parts: first, that each
State is a sovereign entity in our federal system; and second, that ‘[i]t is
inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an
individual without its consent.’”26 The U.S. Supreme Court has also
extended sovereign immunity to bar suits for damages against “arms of
the State”—entities that by their very nature are so intertwined with a state
government that a suit against them renders the state the “real, substantial
party in interest.”27 Congress is allowed to abrogate state sovereign
immunity but only in very narrow situations.28
Under these general principles, the Supreme Court has also long held
that Indian nations possess immunity and cannot be sued by state
governments.29 In 1991, the Court balanced that relationship by also
holding that tribal governments cannot sue states without state consent.30
23. See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 15, at 330–31, 393–402.
24. “The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by
Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. CONST. amend. XI. See also DOBBS ET. AL., supra
note 15, at 329 (stating that the principle of the king’s immunity from lawsuits continued for federal
and state governments after the American Revolution).
25. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996) (quoting Blatchford v. Native Vill. of
Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991)).
26. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 54 (first quoting Blatchford, 501 U.S. at 779; then quoting Hans v.
Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 13 (1890)).
27. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974) (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Dep’t of Treasury,
323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945)); see also Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100
(1984) (“In the absence of consent a suit in which the State or one of its agencies or departments is
named as the defendant is proscribed by the Eleventh Amendment.”); Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd.
of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280–81 (1977) (using the term “arm of the State”).
28. Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 39 (1994); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S.
445, 456 (1976) (holding that the Court only allows Congress to abrogate state immunity and subject
states or state officials to retrospective damage lawsuits when Congress acts within its Fourteenth
Amendment power); Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72 (“Article I cannot be used to circumvent the
constitutional limitations placed upon federal jurisdiction.”).
29. E.g., Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505, 509–10
(1991); Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Dep’t of Game of Wash., 433 U.S. 165, 167–68 (1977).
30. Blatchford, 501 U.S. at 783–88. See also Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261 (1997);
Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59–60 (holding that the Eleventh Amendment prohibited tribe from suing
state to force it to negotiate a compact regarding tribal gaming).
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It should be noted, however, that the ultimate sovereign in our federalist
system, the United States, can sue states or Indian nations and those
governments do not have immunity against the federal government.31
As already mentioned, governments can waive sovereign immunity
and consent to lawsuits against them on specific claims, for specific
damages, and in specific courts. The United States and the state
governments usually do this through statutes.32 Apparently, the first
waiver of federal immunity by Congress was when it enacted the Court of
Claims in 1855 and, as amended in 1887, when it waived its immunity to
lawsuits against the United States for money damages for breach of
contract claims.33 Most if not all state governments have also waived their
immunity to contract claims, but not until much later, such as
Pennsylvania in 1978 and Oregon in 1959, for example.34
Second, the federal government partially waived its immunity to tort
lawsuits in 1946 in the aftermath of a military plane crashing into New
York’s Empire State Building.35 Most if not all states have subsequently
done the same in regard to tort claims. Oregon, for example, partially
waived its immunity for tort lawsuits in 1968.36 But most states severely
limit their exposure to such suits and restrict their waivers to small dollar
amounts. For decades Oregon only allowed torts damages up to $100,000,
and it only raised that amount in 1989.37 Nevada only allowed plaintiffs

31. Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. 262, 271 n.4 (2001); Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 613–
14 (1983). See also NELL JESSUP NEWTON, FELIX COHEN & ROBERT ANDERSON, COHEN’S
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 637 & n.8 (2012).
32. See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 15, at 331; Rogers v. Holmes, 332 P.2d 608, 611 (Or. 1958)
(“That a sovereign state cannot be sued without its consent is a cardinal principle of law so well
established as to require no citation.”).
33. Act of Feb. 24, 1855, 10 Stat. 612 (1855); DOBBS ET AL., supra note 15, at 330, n.9, 332 n.1.
See also COHEN’S, supra note 31, at 652–53. The U.S. Constitution also provides a partial exception
to immunity because governments cannot take private property without paying just compensation.
The Administrative Procedures Act of 1946 also constitutes a partial waiver of federal sovereign
immunity. COHEN’S, supra note 31, at 652, n.112. The current version of the waiver provision for the
U.S. Court of Federal Claims is 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1).
34. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 417 n.13 (1979) (discussing Pennsylvania’s 1978 waiver);
Anderson v. Dep’t of Revenue, 828 P.2d 1001, 1005 n.4 (Or. 1993) (citing the 1959 Oregon law that
waived state immunity to contract claims).
35. 1945
Empire
State
Building
B-25
Crash,
WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1945_Empire_State_Building_B-25_crash
[https://perma.cc/EHZ3TAD8]. The Federal Tort Claims Act, enacted in 1946, is only a limited waiver of federal sovereign
immunity. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 1491, 2402, 2672, 2674–2675 (2012); 1 LESTER S. JAYSON &
ROBERT C. LONGSTRETH, HANDLING FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS 2–4 & § 2.01 (2003).
36. OR. REV. STAT. § 30.270 (2001).
37. OR. REV. STAT. § 30.270.(1)(b) (1988); see also Griffin v. Tri-County Metro. Transp. Dist.,
870 P.2d 808, 810 (Or. 1994).
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in tort suits to recover up to $25,000 as late as 1977.38 Some states have
chosen to retain the complete immunity for certain tort claims. California,
for example, still retains its immunity for many claims related to its
alleged failure to provide fire protection, and for injuries and deaths that
occur due to fighting fires.39
The 1946 Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)40 is worthy of special
attention. In the FTCA, Congress made a limited waiver of federal
sovereign immunity for torts suits filed against any governmental
employee, official, agency, or entity that Congress has expressly made
subject to the Act. But Congress only provided a limited waiver for such
claims, and the terms of those waivers are strictly construed against
plaintiffs and present them with “significant obstacles.”41 Under the
FTCA, plaintiffs can only sue the United States and its agencies, officers,
and employees in a federal court.42 Plaintiffs also have no right to a jury
trial, and if they do prevail, they cannot recover pre-judgment interest,
punitive damages, or attorney’s fees.43 FTCA claims are also strictly time
limited. A claimant must give the relevant officer or employee and the
federal agency six months’ notice of their claim before they can file a
complaint, and they are also required to file suit within six months of an
agency denying their claim or if the agency delays more than six months
in ruling on the claim.44 Claimants have only two years in total from the
date their injury accrued to give this required notice, for the notice period
to run, and then to file their complaints in court.45
Significantly, Congress still retained federal immunity in the FTCA in
many circumstances, including for “the exercise . . . [of] a discretionary
38. Nevada, 440 U.S. at 412–13 n.2, 417 n.13.
39. CAL. GOV. CODE §§ 850, 850.2, 850.4 (2022).
40. 60 Stat. 843 (1946). Its provisions are listed in various sections of the U.S. Code. DOBBS ET
AL., supra note 15, at 332 n.5.
41. See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 15, at 334–45, & Supp. 54 (2021); JONATHAN M. GAFFNEY,
CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45732, THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT (FTCA): A LEGAL OVERVIEW 4, 16–
35 (2019).
42. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). DOBBS ET AL., supra note 15, at 332–33 nn.5 & 8.
43. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2402, 2474, 2671, 2674, 2675(a), 2671–2680; CONG. RSCH. SERV., supra
note 41, at 18–35; Anderson v. United States, 127 F.3d 1190, 1191–92 (9th Cir. 1997) (“Congress
has not waived the government’s sovereign immunity for attorneys’ fees and expenses under the
FTCA.”); see also Bergman v. United States, 844 F.2d 353, 355 (6th Cir. 1988).
44. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 15, at 55 n.7.50 (Supp. 2021); Sconiers v. United States, 896 F.3d
595 (3rd Cir. 2018).
45. Sconiers, 896 F.3d at 595; 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b); DOBBS ET AL., supra note 15, at 332; see
generally Rollo-Carlson v. United States, 971 F.3d 768 (8th Cir. 2020) (dismissing case for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction because plaintiff did not present claim to VA before filing suit); Chronis
v. United States, 932 F.3d 545 (7th Cir. 2019) (dismissing complaint because plaintiff failed to make
a demand for a “sum certain” before filing suit).
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function.”46 This provision has led to a multitude of instances in which the
FTCA was held not to apply, and thus the United States, its agencies, and
employees were still protected from any possible liability in situations
where it appears that the FTCA arguably should have applied.47
Moreover, the FTCA expressly states that federal immunity completely
bars suits against the government in over a dozen specific categories of
torts and for alleged constitutional violations.48 And, ordinarily, waivers
of federal immunity must be construed in favor of protecting the United
States.49 These exceptions and procedural requirements demonstrate that
the FTCA is only a limited waiver of federal sovereign immunity.50 State
tort claims waivers no doubt also retain a multitude of protections for
states and their employees and entities.
This brief look at federal and state sovereign immunity demonstrates
the protections of sovereign immunity that these governments enjoy. It
also sets up the following brief narrative on how the United States and
state governments intervene in their economies through economic entities
and yet often retain immunity protections.
B.

United States Economic Activities and Immunity

Throughout its history, the United States has operated economic
entities and increasingly today has partnered with private enterprise to
operate governmental services, all of which are potentially protected by
sovereign immunity.51 These activities compete with the private sector
46. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a). See United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao, 467 U.S. 797, 814 (1984)
(“Congress wished to prevent judicial ‘second-guessing’ of legislative and administrative decisions
grounded in social, economic, and political policy through the medium of an action in tort.” (emphasis
added)); Hinsley v. Standing Rock Protective Servs. & Bureau of Indian Affs., 516 F.3d. 668, 672
(8th Cir. 2008) (“The FTCA, however, includes a number of exceptions to its broad waiver of
sovereign immunity—and these exceptions apply with equal force to FTCA claims brought against a
tribal organization. . . . [N]o liability shall lie for ‘the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise
or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the
Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused.’” (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a))).
47. See generally, Hinsley, 516 F.3d at 672; Kate Sablosky Elengold & Jonathan D. Glater, The
Sovereign in Commerce, 73 STAN. L. REV. 1101, 1104–05 n.4 (2021).
48. 28 U.S.C. § 2680; FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 477–78 (1994) (FTCA does not waive
sovereign immunity for alleged constitutional violations).
49. Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996); U.S. v. Williams, 514 U.S. 527, 531 (1995).
50. Elengold & Glater, Qualified Sovereignty, supra note 14, at 157 n.13, 164 (The FTCA provides
a limited waiver of immunity in “specified circumstances . . . [and] only in certain circumstances and
in accord with a particular protocol.”); see also id. at 163 (“the Act’s exceptions that restore
immunity”).
51. E.g., id. at 156 & nn.1–4 (private businesses act for the United States in numerous ways such
as fighting wars, operating prisons and detention centers, and managing a $1.6 trillion student loan
portfolio); Elengold & Glater, The Sovereign in Commerce, supra note 47, at 1104–05 & n.4, 1108
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and the principles of capitalism. “Directly and indirectly the federal
government is in the retail business.”52
Between 1795 and 1822, for example, at the suggestion of President
George Washington, Congress authorized the federal government to
establish and operate twenty-nine trading posts across its western frontiers
to control trade with Indian nations and peoples, and to control and even
to purposely exclude private companies from these same activities.53 In
more modern times, Congress has created multiple economic entities
arguably to assist the national economy to operate more efficiently but in
many instances these entities compete with the private sector and
undeniably limit and even exclude private enterprise from the same
opportunities.54 Not surprisingly, issues regarding sovereign immunity for
these federal entities have arisen. Here, we will briefly survey just a few
of the economic entities that Congress has created over the past decades
and how Congress and the courts have dealt with immunity issues.
Operating a nationwide postal service is a constitutionally mandated
federal obligation and the United States has done so since 1789.55 In 1970,
however, Congress turned the Postal Service into an “independent
establishment” and lodged it in the executive branch.56 The President
appoints the board and Congress funds its operations. I mention the Post
Office because today private corporations, like Federal Express (FedEx)
and U.P.S., are in direct competition with the Post Office for all forms of
mail and delivery services. The United States Postal Service even
contracts to deliver packages for Amazon, FedEx, and U.P.S.57 Thus, the
Service has an impact on private sector economic activities. For the
purposes of this Article, it is important to note that even though Congress
made the Service an independent entity, Congress and the courts still
(discussing private contractors conducting a wide range of federal government activities and they are
often protected by federal sovereign immunity); Kate Sablosky Elengold & Jonathan Glater, The
Sovereign Shield, 73 STAN. L. REV. 969, 971–72, 974–75, 975 nn.12–18, 980, 986–92, 1010–21
(2021) (citing cases where private contractors, including military contractors, conducted a wide range
of federal activities and were protected by federal sovereign immunity); Walding v. United States,
995 F.Supp.2d 759, 809–11 (W.D. Tex. 2013) (finding that U.S. sovereign immunity meant private
contractor who allegedly injured minors in detention facility escaped liability).
52. Elengold & Glater, The Sovereign in Commerce, supra note 47, at 1108.
53. MILLER, RESERVATION “CAPITALISM”, supra note 2, at 34, 40 & nn.40 & 60–61; FRANCIS
PAUL PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER: THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND THE AMERICAN
INDIANS 116–24, 130–34 (1995).
54. See infra note 62 and accompanying text.
55. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 7.
56. 39 U.S.C. § 201 (2018).
57. See Mark Solomon, FedEx, UPS Begin the Great Last-mile Delivery Divergence, FREIGHT
WAVES
(2019),
https://www.freightwaves.com/news/fedex-ups-to-begin-the-great-last-miledelivery-divergence [https://perma.cc/7HSU-ASYV].
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partially protect the Service with federal sovereign immunity.58 This is
clear because when Congress applied the FTCA to claims against the
Service, it shows that the Service was previously fully protected and that
Congress has continued to partially provide it with immunity.59 The
Service continues to enjoy the sovereign immunity procedural protections
that the FTCA retains, such as the two-year statute of limitations, the
requirement that claimants exhaust their administrative remedies, the
claim notice period, no juries, no pre-judgment interest, and no punitive
damages.60 Consequently, the Postal Service still enjoys significant
immunity protection.61 These remaining protections surely provide the
Postal Service a competitive advantage over Amazon, Federal Express,
and U.P.S.
In a multitude of other situations, Congress has created federally owned
and operated economic entities and has often only partially waived their
sovereign immunity protections through the FTCA. In 1939, for example,
Congress had created and was using at least forty such federal
corporations to carry out governmental functions.62 Furthermore, in 1995,
the United States General Accounting Office (GAO) issued a 190-page
report profiling fifty-eight then existing U.S. governmental
corporations.63 This report also addressed the extent to which these federal
corporations were covered by the FTCA and thus were still partially
protected in their operations and activities by the United States’ immunity.
Many of these corporations compete directly or indirectly with private
industry and their immunity protections contribute to their profitability
58. 39 U.S.C. § 409(c); Dolan v. U.S. Postal Serv., 546 U.S. 481, 483–84, 486–87 (2006); Baker
v. Runyon, 114 F.3d 668, 671 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. den. sub nom. Baker v. Henderson, 525 U.S. 929
(1998); Cleveland v. Runyon, 972 F.Supp. 1326, 1327 (D. Nev. 1997).
59. See Baker, 114 F.3d at 671 (Congress’ “waiver of sovereign immunity is necessary solely
because the Postal Service is a government agency.”); id. at 669–71 (“Congress’ waiver of the
Service’s sovereign immunity” demonstrates that the Service is a government agency and not subject
to punitive damages under Title VII).
60. 39 U.S.C. § 409(c) (the FTCA “shall apply to tort claims arising out of activities of the Postal
Service”); 28 U.S.C. § 2674; see also supra note 44 and accompanying text.
61. Dolan, 546 U.S. at 484, 486–87 (“[T]he Postal Service enjoys federal sovereign immunity
absent a waiver.”); Postal Serv. v. Flamingo Indus. (USA) Ltd., 540 U.S. 736, 741 (2004); Johnson
v. United States, 529 Fed.Appx. 474, 474 (6th Cir. 2013) (“As an independent establishment of the
executive branch, the USPS enjoys federal sovereign immunity absent a waiver.”).
62. Keifer v. Reconstruction Fin. Corp., 306 U.S. 381, 390 (1939) (“Because of the advantages
enjoyed by the corporate device compared with conventional executive agencies, the exigencies of
war and the enlarged scope of government in economic affairs have greatly extended the use of
independent corporate facilities for governmental ends . . . . [D]uring the past two
decades . . . Congress has provided for not less than forty of such corporations discharging
governmental functions.”).
63. U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS: PROFILES OF EXISTING GOVERNMENT
CORPORATIONS (1995), https://www.gao.gov/assets/ggd-96-14.pdf [https://perma.cc/BN9T-3WR3].
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and give them competitive advantages over private business entities.
In the 1995 GAO report, the agencies/corporations/entities stated
whether Congress had made them subject to the limited waivers of
immunity in the FTCA.64 These organizations run the gamut of economic
activities, and while they were designed to support the national economy
in various ways, it is clear that they compete with the private sector to
greater and lesser extents. We will list here just a few of these
organizations, mention whether Congress partially waived their immunity
by subjecting them to the FTCA, and note how they compete with private
sector businesses.
• The Commodity Credit Corporation. This corporation was
created in 1948 to grant loans to farmers, buy agricultural
products to prop up prices, and provide credit guarantees to
exporters. This entity clearly competes with the private market
in several ways and even actively works to keep agricultural
prices at high levels. The corporation enjoys the protections of
the FTCA.65
• Community Development Financial Institutions Fund.
While created to assist and protect American banking, this
entity could also compete with the private banking industry and
yet it is protected by the limited waivers of immunity in the
FTCA.66
• Corporation for National and Community Service. This
entity promotes community development and national service
and provides grants to community service organizations. It
arguably competes with the private sector in several ways and
yet is protected by the FTCA.67
• Export-Import Bank. The Bank was created in 1934 to help
fund private commerce by providing credit, insurance, and
guarantees to U.S. and foreign banks, purchasers, and foreign
governments to encourage the export of U.S. goods and
services and to facilitate the import of commodities and
services. The Bank is a wholly owned corporation of the
United States, and its board is appointed by the President, by
and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The Bank
clearly seems to be in competition with several sectors of the
private economy, but it is protected by the limited waivers of

64. See id. at 52, 57.
65. Id. at 7, 34, 45, 48.
66. Id. at 7, 50, 52.
67. Id. at 7, 34, 54, 57.
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the FTCA.68
Federal Crop Insurance Corporation. This corporation was
created in 1938 to improve the stability of agriculture through
a system of federal crop insurance for farmers in which the
government pays up to 30% of each producer’s premium. It is
a wholly owned corporation of the U.S. Department of
Agriculture and is covered by the FTCA. This entity surely
competes with the private insurance and farming industries and
impacts the national economy.69
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. This corporation
was created in 1933 to promote public confidence in banks and
to protect the money supply by providing insurance coverage
for bank deposits. The FDIC also administers consumer and
securities laws and requires banks to comply with federal
regulations and to submit reports. It is partially covered by the
FTCA and apparently fully protected by federal sovereign
immunity for some of its activities. The President appoints the
three board members with the advice and consent of the
Senate.70
The Federal Housing Administration. This entity was
created in 1934 to stabilize the home mortgage industry,
encourage improvements in housing standards and conditions,
to provide a financing system of insurance for home mortgages
and credit, and to help stabilize the mortgage market. The FHA
was created to compete with and influence the private housing
and insurance industries in the United States and it has a
significant impact on the national economy.71 The entity is
protected by the FTCA.72
Federal Prison Industries, Inc. (“FPI”). This corporation
was created in 1934 to train prison inmates in the manufacture
of office furniture and furnishings. The FPI operates eighty
industrial factories in thirty-seven federal prisons and sells its
goods and services only to correctional institutions and federal
departments. Even though its sales market is limited, this does
not limit its competition with and its major impact on the
private office furnishings industry. The FPI is protected by the

68. Id. at 7, 34, 59, 62.
69. Id. at 7, 34, 64, 66.
70. Id. at 7, 34, 68–69, 72; FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 471 (1994).
71. E.g., Quintin Johnstone, Private Mortgage Insurance, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 783, 822–25,
836–38 (2004).
72. U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., supra note 63, at 7, 76, 79.
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FTCA. It is a wholly owned government corporation, and its
board is appointed by the President.73
• Government National Mortgage Association (“Ginnie
Mae”). Ginnie Mae was established in 1968 to facilitate the
funding of home mortgages and to provide mortgage-backed
securities. The entity appears to have been designed to assist
private banks, saving, and loans to be more profitable and to
assist the national home mortgage market. But it also appears
to compete with the private housing and lending markets and
impacts the national housing market. The entity claims that it
is not statutorily subject to the FTCA but that it has
administratively adopted it.74
• Rural Telephone Bank. This entity was created in 1971 to
provide loans to private telephone companies. It would seem
to have an impact on the private sector, and it is protected by
the FTCA.75
The GAO issued a similar report in 1988 of over three hundred pages,
which includes federally owned and operated corporations and entities,
many of which compete with the private sector.76 They were, of course,
created with laudable goals in mind. I am only pointing out their possible
competition with private businesses and their sovereign immunity
protections.
• Farm Credit Banks. This system of banks was created in 1988
by Congress through a merger of several federal entities. Its
mission is to provide loans to “farmers, ranchers, rural
homeowners, owners of farm related businesses and
commercial fishermen.”77 It acts as a clearing agent for thirtyseven farm credit banks and also buys, sells, and holds farm
credit securities. It is a federally chartered instrumentality of
the United States and competes with the private insurance and
lending industries. Moreover, it affects the nationwide
agricultural system. The 1988 GAO report does not clearly
state whether the entities on which it reports are protected by
the FTCA as the 1995 report does. The Bank and other federal
agency banks state in this 1988 report that Congress granted
73. Id. at 7, 82, 85, 105. See also United States v. Demko, 385 U.S. 149, 152–53 (1966) (analyzing,
without deciding, whether FTCA could apply to ex-inmate’s injury claim for working in prison).
74. U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., supra note 63, at 7, 34, 87, 90.
75. Id. at 8, 34, 132, 135.
76. U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., PROFILES OF EXISTING GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS (1988),
https://www.gao.gov/assets/90/88616.pdf [https://perma.cc/DWT4-7X2U].
77. Id. at 50.
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them the power to “sue and be sued.”78 Some courts have held
that such a power is a waiver of sovereign immunity, but
multiple courts disagree. Thus, the Bank might enjoy total
federal immunity or perhaps be subject to the limited waivers
of the FTCA.79
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation. This
entity was created in 1934 to ensure the liquidity of federal
savings and loan associations, federal mutual savings banks,
and state-chartered institutions. It is a wholly owned
government corporation and would appear to impact the
private sector. Its board members are all appointed by the
President. Congress also authorized it to “sue and be sued” but
note my comments on that provision in the Farm Credit Bank
entry immediately above.80
Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation. This corporation
was created in 1978 to promote investments in older
neighborhoods by local financial institutions. All six of its
board members are appointed by the President. It would seem
to be in competition with the private financing industry. It is
also authorized to “sue and be sued” but, as mentioned above,
that ambiguous legal phrase might not mean the United States
has waived the corporation’s immunity protections.81
Student Loan Marketing Association. This corporation is an
agency of the United States and was created in 1972 to serve
as a secondary market for student loans and to assist students
to finance their college educations. The entity appears to be in

78. Id. at 53; Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. A&P Steel, Inc., 874 F.2d 550, 552 (8th Cir. 1989); contra
Dillion v. Yankton Sioux Tribe Hous. Auth., 144 F.3d 581, 583–84 (8th Cir. 1998).
79. U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., supra note 63, at 50–57; 12 U.S.C. § 2001 et seq.; see generally Selland
v. United States, 966 F.2d 346 (8th Cir. 1992) (finding no private cause of action existed under the
Agricultural Credit Act of 1987). Several courts have rejected the idea that a “sue and be sued” clause
is a clear enough waiver to hold that Congress or an Indian nation has waived sovereign immunity for
a governmental department or business entity. Instead, these courts have held that the clause just
authorizes that entity to prospectively waive its immunity, in contracts for example, on a case-by-case
basis as that entity decides. Fed. Hous. Admin. v. Burr, 309 U.S. 242, 245 (1940) (“Congress which,
as we have said, has full authority to make such restrictions on the ‘sue and be sued’ clause as seem
to it appropriate or necessary”); Hagen v. Sisseton-Wahpeton Cmty. Coll., 205 F.3d 1040, 1043 (8th
Cir. 2000); Dillon v. Yankton Sioux Tribe Hous. Auth., 144 F.3d 581, 583–84 (8th Cir. 1998);
Medina v. Jicarilla Apache Hous. Auth., No. Civ. 06-877, 2007 WL 1176023 at *1 (D.N.M. Feb.
2, 2007) (“sue and be sued” clause in tribal ordinance creating Housing Authority did not waive
immunity); Olson v. Nooksack, 6 N.I.C.S. App. 49, 52–53 (Nooksack Tribe Ct. App. 2001) (holding
immunity was preserved absent express waiver; tribal housing code authorizing Housing Authority
to “sue or be sued” was not a sufficiently clear waiver).
80. U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., supra note 63, at 114–16.
81. Id. at 180–81.
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competition with private industry. Seven members of its
twenty-one-person board are appointed by the President.
Today, the Association relies on private entities to manage $1.6
trillion in U.S.-backed student loans. The private entities
working for the corporation have used federal sovereign
immunity to shield their activities from legal scrutiny.82
This brief description of just a few of the corporations and entities
Congress has created is sufficient to demonstrate that the federal
government is actively involved in managing and even operating its
national economy through governmental commercial entities.
Furthermore, today, an increasing number of private contractors offer
services and goods to or for the United States, including military
activities, and they often enjoy sovereign immunity and other federal
governmental immunities.83 It appears correct to assume that these
concerns compete either directly or at least indirectly with private
business. In addition, these entities are undoubtedly still protected by
federal sovereign immunity to some extent even if Congress has exposed
them to the limited liabilities of the FTCA.
C.

State Economic Activities and Immunity

State governments also create, own, and operate entities and
corporations that impact economic outcomes. Moreover, states often
attempt to protect these concerns through state sovereign immunity. Of
course, Indian nations have the exact same objectives in operating their
governmental and economic activities and clearly, they are not acting
outside state and federal norms.84
State owned and operated business entities run the gamut across the
United States. For example, forty-eight states and U.S. territories allow
gambling lotteries that are operated by government agencies, departments,
or corporations.85 Furthermore, North Dakota owns and operates the
North Dakota Mill and Elevator, the largest flour mill and the only stateowned mill in the United States.86 It is overseen by the state Industrial

82. See Elengold & Glater, The Sovereign Shield, supra note 51, at 1010–30.
83. See generally Elengold & Glater, Qualified Sovereignty, supra note 14; Elengold & Glater, The
Sovereign in Commerce, supra note 47.
84. See infra section II.B.
85. Lotteries
in
the
United
States,
WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lotteries_in_the_United_States [https://perma.cc/DMD7-Q9P9].
86. Gretchen Dykstra, Pragmatism on the Prairie, N.Y. TIMES (March 30, 2012),
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/31/opinion/pragmatism-on-the-prairie.html (last visited Sept. 11,
2022).
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Commission and its members are publicly elected.87 South Dakota has
operated a state wide public broadcasting network of educational radio
stations since 1919, and a network of television stations since 1961.88
These state entities compete with the private sector in the gambling,
milling, and media arenas. States even admit that their economically
related activities “participate[] in activities or provide[] services that are
also provided by private enterprise.”89
In addition, states operate public universities that directly compete with
private universities for students and tuition dollars. Most, if not all, courts
have held that these state institutions enjoy the protections of sovereign
immunity.90 “[T]he vast majority of state universities . . . have been found
to be ‘arms’ of the State for immunity and diversity purposes . . . .”91
Many states also operate publicly owned hospitals and housing authorities
that compete with the private health and housing industries yet they are
often protected by immunity.92 And, states operate other economic entities
like ports and public transportation systems that compete directly with the
private sector; these entities also often enjoy immunity protections.93
87. Id.
88. South
Dakota
Public
Broadcasting,
WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_Dakota_Public_Broadcasting [https://perma.cc/4XS7-GZCW].
89. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 353.010(2) (2020) (“‘Public corporation’ means an entity that is
created by the state to carry out public missions and services. In order to carry out these public
missions and services, a public corporation participates in activities or provides services that are also
provided by private enterprise.”).
90. See, e.g., Maliandi v. Montclair State Univ., 845 F.3d 77, 99 (3rd Cir. 2016) (holding state
university was an arm of the state entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal
court); Kreipke v. Wayne State Univ., 807 F.3d 768, 776 (6th Cir. 2015); Rutledge v. Ariz. Bd. of
Regents, 660 F.2d 1345, 1349 (9th Cir. 1981), aff’d sub nom. Kush v. Rutledge, 460 U.S. 719 (1983)
(Arizona State University and Arizona Board of Regents are arms or instrumentalities of the State
and share in the State’s immunity). Even state school districts can enjoy immunity. Vendrell v. Sch.
Dist. No. 26C, 226 Or. 263, 278 (1961).
91. Univ. of Rhode Island v. A.W. Chesterton Co., 2 F.3d 1200, 1204 (1st Cir. 1993). Accord
Irizarry-Mora v. Univ. of Puerto Rico, 647 F.3d 9, 14–17 (1st Cir. 2011) (finding the institution’s
impact on Puerto Rico’s treasury weighed in favor of finding the University was an arm of the state);
accord Hall v. Med. Coll. of Ohio at Toledo, 742 F.2d 299, 301–02 (6th Cir. 1984); Lazarescu v.
Ariz. State Univ., 230 F.R.D. 596, 601 (D. Ariz. 2005).
92. See Clarke v. Or. Health Sci. Univ., 343 Or. 581, 593 (2007); Jenkins v. Portland Hous. Auth.,
260 Or. App. 26, 33 (2013). But see Fresenius Medical Care Cardiovascular Res., Inc. v. Puerto Rico,
322 F.3d 56, 68–75 (1st Cir. 2003) (deciding in a breach of contract suit against public corporation
hospital that hospital was not an arm of the state because there was no direct risk of state losing money
from any judgment).
93. See, e.g., Griffin v. Tri–County Metro. Trans. Dist., 318 Or. 500, 507–10 (1994) (holding
Oregon Tort Claims Act limit in 1987 of liability of a public body to $100,000 applies to damages,
attorney fees, and costs); Hale v. Port of Portland, 308 Or. 508, 518 (1989) (holding damage
limitations in the Oregon Tort Claims Act are constitutional as applied to cities and port districts);
Noonan v. City of Portland, 88 P.2d 808, 821 (Or. 1939). But see Fitchik v. N.J. Transit Rail
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This brief survey of a sampling of federal and state corporations and
business entities, and the extent to which they enjoy the protections of
sovereign immunity, demonstrates that these governments intervene and
operate within their own economies to varying extents at the same time
that they enjoy competitive advantages over private industry due to being
governmental entities. We now look at similar activities conducted by
Indian nations across the United States.
II.

INDIAN NATIONS’ SOVEREIGNTY, SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY, ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES, AND JUDICIAL
INTERFERENCE

The Indigenous nations and peoples of North America have exercised
governmental sovereign powers since time immemorial. The European
nations and American colonial governments worked with tribal nations
through treaty-making and international diplomatic interactions for
centuries before the United States was created.94 The new national
government then continued to deal with Indian nations as governments
and political entities through diplomacy and treaty-making.95 Tribal
governments, their separate existence, and their sovereignty are
recognized in the U.S. Constitution and have been so recognized by the
United States government ever since.96 For more than one hundred and
fifty years, the federal courts have also explicitly recognized sovereign
immunity as an inherent aspect of tribal sovereignty.97
In recent decades, however, state and federal courts have intruded on
these rights. Some courts have developed multi-factor tests to determine
if and when tribal governmental businesses are considered an arm of the
tribe, thereby sharing immunity protections from unconsented lawsuits.
These federal and state court cases have muddied the waters and created
uncertainty of when and how sovereign immunity will protect tribal
businesses. In this Part, we examine tribal sovereignty and immunity, the
Operations, Inc., 873 F.2d 655, 660 (3d Cir. 1989) (denying immunity to a regional rail authority
despite receiving state funding, “that an entity derives some of its income from the state does not
mean that it is entitled to partake of the state’s immunity”).
94. Robert J. Miller, Treaties Between the Eastern Shawnee Tribe and the United States: Contracts
Between Sovereign Governments, in THE EASTERN SHAWNEE TRIBE OF OKLAHOMA: RESILIENCE
THROUGH ADVERSITY 107, 107–09 (Stephen Warren ed., 2017).
95. Id.
96. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 789 (2014).
97. See Bay Mills, 572 U.S. at 788–89; Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Techs., 523 U.S. 751, 760 (1998);
United States v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506, 512 (1940); Turner v. United States, 248
U.S. 354, 357–58 (1919); William Wood, It Wasn’t an Accident: The Tribal Sovereign Immunity
Story, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 1587, 1594 (2013) (discussing a U.S. Supreme Court case from 1850 and
two Eighth Circuit cases from 1895 and 1908 that recognized tribal sovereign immunity).
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multi-factor tests courts have developed to determine arm-of-the-tribe
status, and their impacts on tribal immunity. Part III will then examine
and critique how these cases are negatively impacting tribal decisions,
sovereign powers, and the efficiency, operations, and profitability of tribal
business entities.
A.

Tribal Sovereignty and Sovereign Immunity

American Indian nations are governmental entities and political bodies
that exercised jurisdiction and governance in North America for centuries
before Europeans arrived.98 From the outset, European nations and
colonial governments dealt with Indian nations through treaty-making and
political diplomacy.99 Today, Indian nations continue to exercise
jurisdiction and governmental authority over Indian Country, sometimes
beyond those areas, and over their citizens and non-citizens alike.100 As
governments, tribal nations enjoy most of the same aspects of sovereignty
as do federal and state governments.
The new United States continued the European and colonial tactics of
dealing politically and diplomatically with Indian nations. The American
Founding Fathers even enshrined the political status and sovereign
existence and authority of Indian nations into the United States
Constitution. The 1789 Constitution retained and strengthened the
principle, from the 1781 Articles of Confederation, that state governments
have no authority in Indian affairs and that only “Congress shall have
Power . . . To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the
several States, and with the Indian Tribes . . . .”101 The U.S. Supreme
Court has cited this provision dozens if not hundreds of times. This
provision and our Constitution expressly recognize that there are three

98. E.g., Robert J. Miller, American Indian Sovereignty Versus the United States, THE ROUTLEDGE
HANDBOOK OF CRITICAL INDIGENOUS STUDIES 347, 347–51 (Brendan Hokowhitu et al. eds., 2021).
99. Id. at 350–52; Miller, Treaties Between the Eastern Shawnee, supra note 94, at 107–08; 1 VINE
DELORIA JR. & RAYMOND J. DEMALLIE, DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN INDIAN DIPLOMACY: TREATIES,
AGREEMENTS, AND CONVENTIONS, 1775–1979 6, 103, 106–07 (1999); FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA,
AMERICAN INDIAN TREATIES: THE HISTORY OF A POLITICAL ANOMALY 8–9, 59 (1994); 4
SMITHSONIAN INST., HANDBOOK OF NORTH AMERICAN INDIANS (HISTORY OF INDIAN-WHITE
RELATIONS) 128–43, 185–94, 211–29 (Wilcomb E. Washburn ed., 1988).
100. Bay Mills, 572 U.S. at 782; Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 760; Washington v. Wash. State Com.
Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658, 675 (1979); Pink v. Modoc Indian Health Project,
Inc., 157 F.3d 1185, 1189 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that non-profit corporation created by two tribes
was protected by sovereign immunity for conduct that included off-reservation activities); Settler v.
Lameer, 507 F.2d 231, 238 (9th Cir. 1974).
101. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3. This provision is the Interstate Commerce Clause and is also
called the Indian Commerce Clause by the U.S. Supreme Court.

Miller (Do Not Delete)

796

11/2/22 10:49 PM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 97:775

governments within the United States: federal, state, and Indian tribes.102
The Interstate/Indian Commerce Clause clearly acknowledges Indian
nations as governments that are somewhat similar to the states and the
foreign nations. This clause was expressly drafted to grant the United
States Congress the exclusive authority to deal with Native governments
and to exclude state governments from meddling in Indian affairs.103
The Constitution also impliedly refers to Indian nations in the
Supremacy and Treaty Clauses in Article VI where it states that “all
Treaties made, or which shall be made, . . . shall be the supreme Law of
the Land . . . .”104 By the spring of 1789, when the new United States
national government created under our Constitution began operating, the
United States had entered twenty-three treaties with foreign countries and
nine treaties with Indian nations.105 Thus, the Treaty Clause language, “all
Treaties made, or which shall be made,” ratified these prior foreign and
Indian nation treaties as the supreme law of the United States, and
provided that same status for future treaties with foreign countries and
with tribes.106 Consequently, this constitutional provision recognizes
Indian nations as governments that possess the sovereign existence and
power to engage in diplomacy and treaty-making with the United States.
Constitutionally authorized treaty-making with tribal nations is a very
significant point because it demonstrates that the United States recognizes
the inherent political and sovereign existence of Indian nations. As the
U.S. Supreme Court stated in 1979: “A treaty, including one between the
United States and an Indian tribe, is essentially a contract between two
sovereign nations.”107 From 1778 to 1871, the U.S. negotiated and ratified
375 treaties with Indian nations and at least two treaties with the Kingdom
of Hawaii in 1849 and 1875.108
102. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3; ROBERT J. MILLER, NATIVE AMERICA, DISCOVERED AND
CONQUERED: THOMAS JEFFERSON, LEWIS & CLARK, AND MANIFEST DESTINY 43–44 (2006).
103. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 191–92
(1989); Cnty. of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 234 n.4 (1985) (“Madison cited the
National Government’s inability to control trade with the Indians as one of the key deficiencies of the
Articles of Confederation, and urged adoption of the Indian Commerce Clause. . . .”); THE
FEDERALIST NO. 3 (John Jay); THE FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James Madison); Robert J. Miller, American
Indian Influence on the United States Constitution and its Framers, 18 AM. IND. L. REV. 133, 133–
34, 143–45, 151–54 & nn.145–62 (1993); FELIX S. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW
207–57 (Rennard Strickland ed., 1982).
104. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
105. See, e.g., Miller, Treaties Between the Eastern Shawnee, supra note 94, at 110.
106. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (emphasis added); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559
(1832).
107. Washington v. Wash. State Com. Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658, 675 (1979).
108. Miller, Treaties Between the Eastern Shawnee, supra note 94, at 107–09; Treaty with the
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Individual Indians, and their citizenship in their own sovereign nations,
are also expressly noted in the Constitution, in Article I and in the
Fourteenth Amendment which was ratified in 1868. In counting the
population of the states for the decadal census, Indians were not counted
as part of a state’s population unless they paid taxes.109 In effect, the
Constitution and our Founding Fathers recognized that Indians were not
federal or state citizens because they were citizens of their own nations.
After the Civil War, when citizenship rights were extended to “[a]ll
persons born or naturalized in the United States” the
Fourteenth Amendment still “exclud[ed] Indians not taxed.”110 This
demonstrates again that as of 1868 Congress still considered Indians to be
citizens of their own sovereign governments and not federal or state
citizens. In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed with this point in 1884
when it held that the Fourteenth Amendment had not made Indians
citizens.111 It was not until 1924 that Congress made all Indians United
States citizens.112
The United States Supreme Court has also made repeated and
numerous statements that recognize and support tribal sovereignty. In
1831 for example, the Court held that Indian nations are
governments/states that possess political sovereignty.113 The Court stated
that tribes had:
been uniformly treated as a state from the settlement of our
country. The numerous treaties made with them by the United
States recognize them as a people capable of maintaining the
relations of peace and war, of being responsible in their political
character . . . . The acts of our government plainly recognize the
Cherokee nation as a state . . . .114
The next year, the Court stated that the history and actions of the United
States towards Indigenous governments were proof that the U.S.
“manifestly consider the several Indian nations as distinct political
communities, having territorial boundaries, within which their authority
is exclusive, and having a right to all the lands within those

Hawaiian Islands, Haw.-U.S., Dec. 20, 1849, 9 Stat. 977; Convention between the United States of
America and His Majesty the King of the Hawaiian Islands. Commercial Reciprocity., Haw.-U.S.,
Dec. 6, 1884, 19 Stat. 625.
109. U.S. CONST. art I, § 2, cl. 3.
110. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
111. Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 120 (1884).
112. Indian Citizenship Act, Pub. L. No. 68-175, 43 Stat. 253 (1924).
113. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 68 (1831).
114. Id. at 1–2.
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boundaries . . . .”115 Therefore, the Court stated that Indian nations are
“distinct, independent political communities, retaining their original
natural rights” of land ownership and self-governance.116 The Court’s
analysis also included this salient point:
The very term ‘nation,’ so generally applied to them, means ‘a
people distinct from others.’ The constitution, by declaring
treaties already made, as well as those to be made, to be the
supreme law of the land, has adopted and sanctioned the previous
treaties with the Indian nations, and consequently admits their
rank among those powers who are capable of making treaties. The
words ‘treaty’ and ‘nation’ are words of our own language,
selected in our diplomatic and legislative proceedings, by
ourselves, having each a definite and well understood meaning.
We have applied them to Indians, as we have applied them to the
other nations of the earth. They are applied to all in the same
sense.117
The Supreme Court continued to render decisions and make key
statements about the existence and extent of tribal sovereignty in
subsequent centuries. In 1896, the Court stated that Indian governments
do not acquire their political existence or sovereign authorities from the
United States or from the Constitution.118 In fact, the Court expressly
noted in Talton v. Mayes,119 and has frequently reaffirmed, that tribal
governments predate the Constitution and that tribal sovereignty was not
created by the Constitution or by Congress and that tribal nations are
unrestrained by constitutional and federal provisions that limit federal and
state authorities.120 Instead, tribal governments’ sovereignty and

115. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559–60 (1832).
116. Id. at 559.
117. Id. at 559–60.
118. Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896). In 1883, the Court held that the federal
government did not possess criminal jurisdiction in Indian Country over criminal acts between Indian
individuals. Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883). Indian nations remain a “separate people, with
the power of regulating their internal and social relations.” U.S. v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381–82
(1886).
119. Talton, 163 U.S. at 384.
120. Id. at 382, 384 (holding that the Fifth Amendment does not apply to tribes; the “Cherokee
Nation” and its “attributes of local self government . . . existed prior to the Constitution,” and
exercised not “Federal powers” but powers of “self government,” and that “powers [were] not created
by the Constitution”); Native Am. Church v. Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F.2d 131, 134–35 (10th Cir.
1959) (holding that aspects of First Amendment do not apply to tribes). See also United States v.
Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 319–21, 323–24, 328 (1978) (stating that double jeopardy does not prevent
federal and tribal governments from trying a defendant for the same criminal act because they are
separate governments); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978); Miller, American
Indian Influence, supra note 103, at 158–59.
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sovereign powers are the “inherent powers of a limited sovereignty which
has never been extinguished.”121 Therefore, tribal nations are “separate
sovereigns pre-existing the Constitution.”122
As one of the three separate forms of government in the United States,
Indian nations enjoy the standard governmental protection of sovereign
immunity against unconsented suits by tribal citizens, other individuals,
or state governments.123 The Supreme Court has stated that immunity “is
a necessary corollary to Indian sovereignty and self-governance.”124 In
1978 for example, the Court stated: “Indian tribes have long been
recognized as possessing the common-law immunity from suit
traditionally enjoyed by sovereign powers.”125 In 2014, the Court repeated
that point: “Among the core aspects of sovereignty that tribes
possess . . . is the ‘common law immunity from suit traditionally enjoyed
by sovereign powers.’”126 Thus, tribal governments cannot be sued in
tribal, state, or federal courts without their specific consent except by the
United States itself.127
In recent decades, the Court has consistently applied and even
strengthened this legal right to protect tribal governments from lawsuits.
For example, the Court has held that immunity applies when an Indian
nation is acting in a governmental or business capacity, and whether or
not the activity at issue occurs inside or outside of Indian Country.128 The
principle of tribal immunity is so strong that Indian nations can even file
lawsuits as a plaintiff and yet they still retain immunity from compulsory
121. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 322–24. See also United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 210 (2004)
(holding that Indian nations exercise powers of self-government via original tribal sovereignty);
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Rsrv., 447 U.S. 134, 152–54 (1980);
Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 149 (1982).
122. Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 52. See also Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S.
782, 788 (2014) (finding tribal sovereign immunity derives from the status of Indian tribes as
“separate sovereigns pre-existing the Constitution” (quoting Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 56)).
123. Bay Mills, 572 U.S. at 788–89; Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Techs., 523 U.S. 751, 760 (1998); Santa
Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 58; United States v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506, 512 (1940);
Turner v. United States, 248 U.S. 354, 358 (1919).
124. Three Affiliated Tribes of the Ft. Berthold Rsrv. v. Wold Eng’g, 476 U.S. 877, 890 (1986);
accord Bay Mills, 572 U.S. at 788.
125. Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 58.
126. Bay Mills, 572 U.S. at 788 (quoting Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 58).
127. Id.; Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 754; Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 58; Kerr v. Muckleshoot,
6 N.I.C.S. App. 36, 37 (Muckleshoot Tribal Ct. App. 2001).
128. Bay Mills, 572 U.S. at 804; Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 760 (holding that tribe was protected by
immunity even though contract was signed and involved commercial activity outside Indian Country);
Sac & Fox Nation v. Hanson, 47 F.3d 1061, 1064–65 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding that directors of tribe’s
commercial entity could not sue tribe because there was no waiver of immunity just because tribe
operated commercial activities off reservation); Kerr, 6 N.I.C.S. App. at 37 (holding that tribal
sovereign immunity applies to agencies as well as commercial activities of the tribe).
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cross-claims and counterclaims.129
Moreover, tribal governmental entities, agencies, departments, and
tribally owned businesses, colloquially known as arms of the tribe,
whether they are created to perform governmental activities or purely
commercial activities, usually benefit from the protections of tribal
sovereign immunity.130 This is so because Congress has recognized that
tribal immunity is necessary “in order to promote economic development
and tribal self-sufficiency,”131 that tribal economic development “foster[s]
tribal self-government,”132 that immunity furthers “tribal self-sufficiency
and economic development,”133 and “reflect[s] Congress’ desire to
promote the goal of Indian self-government, including its overriding goal
of encouraging tribal self-sufficiency and economic development.”134
In addition, tribal officials are usually protected from lawsuits or court
process by their nation’s sovereign immunity if they were acting within
the scope of their tribal authority and in the absence of a congressional or
tribal waiver of that protection.135 In 2019, however, the Second Circuit
extended by analogy the famous 2008 Supreme Court case Ex parte
Young136 to allow state citizens to sue tribal officials and employees in

129. Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505, 509–10 (1991);
Wold Eng’g, 476 U.S. at 890; McClendon v. United States, 885 F.2d 627, 630–33 (9th Cir. 1989);
Squaxin Island Tribe v. Washington, 781 F.2d 715, 723 (9th Cir. 1986).
130. See, e.g., J.L. Ward Assoc. v. Great Plains Tribal Chairmen’s Health Bd., 842 F.Supp.2d 1163
(D.S.D. 2012) (involving a health board created by sixteen tribes which was a tribal entity that was
protected by sovereign immunity). State entities, called arms of the state, also share in the sovereign
immunity of state governments: “an arm or instrumentality of the State generally enjoys the same
immunity as the sovereign itself.” Lewis v. Clarke, 581 U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 1285, 1290 (2017).
131. Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 757 (“Congress had failed to abrogate [tribal immunity] in order to
promote economic development and tribal self-sufficiency.”).
132. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 138 n.5 (1982).
133. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. at 510. See also Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at
758.
134. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. at 510 (internal quotations omitted). See also
Wold Eng’g, 476 U.S. at 890 (tribal immunity “is a necessary corollary to Indian sovereignty and selfgovernance”); Allen v. Gold Country Casino, 464 F.3d 1044, 1047 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Immunity of the
Casino directly protects the sovereign Tribe’s treasury, which is one of the historic purposes of
sovereign immunity in general.”); Breakthrough Mgmt. Grp., Inc. v. Chukchansi Gold Casino &
Resort, 629 F.3d 1173, 1182–83 (10th Cir. 2010) (finding that immunity serves to “protect the
sovereign Tribe’s treasury,” “encourage[s] tribal self-sufficiency,” and is “necessary to promote the
federal policies of tribal self-determination, economic development, and cultural autonomy”).
135. Lewis, 581 U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. at 1291; Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 754, 758 (finding that
sovereign immunity has been necessary to protect tribes from state invasions of their jurisdiction);
Osage Tribal Council v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 187 F.3d 1174, 1179–80 (10th Cir. 1999); Tamiami
Partners, Ltd. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla., 63 F.3d 1030, 1050 (11th Cir. 1995); United
States v. Yakima Tribal Ct., 806 F.2d 853, 861 (9th Cir. 1986); Romanella v. Hayward, 933 F. Supp.
163, 167 (D. Conn. 1996), aff’d, 114 F.3d 15 (2nd Cir. 1997).
136. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
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their official capacities for prospective and injunctive relief for allegedly
violating federal and state substantive laws.137 In addition, claims against
tribal officers and employees deemed to have acted in their individual
capacities, or beyond their tribal authority, will usually not be barred by a
tribe’s immunity.138
Furthermore, there are only two valid ways that tribal immunity can be
waived. Congress has the authority to waive tribal sovereign immunity
and tribal governments can also do so.139 Both types of waivers, however,
must be clearly, explicitly, and expressly stated.140 A waiver “cannot be
implied but must be unequivocally expressed.”141 And, in fact, courts
apply a “strong presumption against waiver.”142
Tribes often waive their immunity in contracts.143 Almost all tribal
governments have waived their immunity in specific situations and
contracts to facilitate business deals.144 Tribes primarily have to waive
137. Gingras v. Think Fin., Inc., 922 F.3d 112 (2nd Cir. 2019) (applying Young to allow state
citizens to sue tribal officials in their official capacities for alleged violations of state and federal
substantive law), cert den. sub nom. Sequoia Cap., LLC v. Gingras, __ U.S. __, 140 S. Ct. 856 (2020).
138. Lewis, 581 U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. at 1292–93 (claims against tribal officers/employees in their
individual capacities are not barred by immunity); see also Stanko v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 916 F.3d
694, 697–98 (8th Cir. 2019).
139. See Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 789 (2014); Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at
724; Citizen Band Potawatomi, 498 U.S. at 509; Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58–59
(1978) (“A waiver of [tribal] sovereign immunity ‘cannot be implied, but must be unequivocally
expressed.’” (quoting United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976))); Sokaogon Gaming Enter.
Corp. v. Tushie-Montgomery Assocs., 86 F.3d 656, 659 (7th Cir. 1996); Kerr v. Muckleshoot, 6
N.I.C.S. App. 36, 37 (Muckleshoot Tribal Ct. App. 2001).
140. Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 58; Sokaogon Gaming, 86 F.3d at 659; United States v.
Oregon, 657 F.2d 1009, 1012 (9th Cir. 1981).
141. United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976); Olson v. Nooksack, 6 N.I.C.S. App. 49,
52–53 (Nooksack Tribe Ct. App. 2001) (holding that tribal immunity is preserved absent an express
waiver).
142. Bodi v. Shingle Springs Band of Miwok Indians, 832 F.3d 1011, 1016 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting
Demontiney v. Dep’t Interior, Bureau of Indian Affs., 255 F.3d 801, 811 (9th Cir. 2001)).
143. See generally Lorenzo E. Gudino, Who, What, Where, and How: The Fundamental Elements
for Contracts Implicating Tribal Sovereign Immunity, 2022 WIS. L. REV. 239 (2022).
144. See, e.g., id.; MILLER, RESERVATION “CAPITALISM”, supra note 2, at 97–98. For a time, there
were apparently conflicting cases whether contractual agreements to arbitrate were valid waivers of
tribal immunity. Compare Pan Am. Co. v. Sycuan Band of Mission Indians, 884 F.2d 416, 419–20
(9th Cir. 1989) (holding that contract that provided for disputes to be arbitrated but did not mention
court actions to enforce any award did not waive immunity), with Sokaogon Gaming, 86 F.3d at 659–
60, and Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Val-U Constr. Co., 50 F.3d 560, 562 (8th Cir. 1995). See also First
Specialty Ins. Corp. v. Confederated Tribes of the Grand Ronde C’mty, No. 07-05-KI, 2007 WL
3283699, at *3 (D. Or. Nov. 2, 2007) (granting comity to the tribal court decision in First Specialty
Ins. Corp. v. Confederated Tribes of the Grand Ronde C’mty, No. A-05-09-001, at *1, *16–21 (Grand
Ronde Ct. App. Oct 31, 2006) and stating that a tribe’s consent to arbitration did not also waive its
immunity for attorney fees when there was no mention of waiving immunity to attorney fees in the
agreement). In 2001, however, the Supreme Court held unanimously that a contract providing for
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their immunity in this ad hoc fashion instead of by enacting laws that
might waive immunity to all contract lawsuits, for example. This
prospective and individualized method of waiver is time consuming, but
it is about the only way to deal with this subject for tribal properties and
assets that are held in trust, legal ownership, by the United States.145 This
is a fact of life because federal approval of contracts regarding
tribal/United States trust properties is a requirement for most contracts,
and for a waiver of tribal immunity in the contract to be valid.146 This is
the main reason why waivers of tribal immunity are usually accomplished
on an individual contractual basis.
Moreover, many Indian nations have enacted tort claims statutes and
made limited waivers of sovereign immunity to allow tort suits to be filed
against them the same as federal and state governments have done. For
example, the Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians in
Michigan, the Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Nation in Connecticut, and the
Grand Ronde, Umatilla, Siletz, and Warm Springs Tribes in Oregon, have
enacted tort claims ordinances waiving their immunity in certain cases.147
These nations have decided to enact limited waivers and open their courts
to persons injured in tribal establishments. In addition, many, if not all,
Indian nations carry insurance policies. And, tribal enterprises or
governmental departments and their employees that operate certain
federal programs are also covered by the Federal Tort Claim Act for
liability for acts committed in carrying out those programs, and thus the
public is protected to the extent of the FTCA.148
This discussion demonstrates that Indian nations are governments
separate from state and federal governments. As pre-Constitution political
entities, tribal governments possess inherent powers of sovereignty,
including immunity from unconsented lawsuits. Indian nations use
sovereignty and immunity in the operation of their business entities in the
exact same fashion as the United States and state governments.

arbitration, that also stated that Oklahoma law would apply, and that any court with jurisdiction could
enforce the award, was an express waiver. This was so even though the agreement did not mention
tribal sovereign immunity or provide for a waiver of that immunity. C & L Enters., Inc. v. Citizen
Band Potawatomi Tribe, 532 U.S. 411, 414–15, 418–20, 423 (2001); David D. Haddock & Robert J.
Miller, Can a Sovereign Protect Investors from Itself? Tribal Institutions to Spur Reservation
Investment, 8 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 173, 197–98, 220 (2004).
145. See MILLER, RESERVATION “CAPITALISM”, supra note 2, at 97.
146. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 81, 177, 415, 466, 2103(b), 3104(b); 25 C.F.R. § 166.300; Wells Fargo Bank
v. Lake of the Torches Econ. Dev. Corp., 658 F.3d 684, 686, 694, 702 (7th Cir. 2011).
147. MILLER, RESERVATION “CAPITALISM,” supra note 2, at 97–98.
148. 25 U.S.C. § 458cc(c); Dep’t of Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, Pub. L.
No. 103–138, § 308, 107 Stat. 1379, 1416 (1993); 25 C.F.R. §§ 900.180–.210, 255.6(c) & (e) (1998).
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Tribal Economic Activities

Poverty is rampant on nearly all American Indian reservations.149
Living wage jobs, adequate housing, educational opportunities, and
functioning economies are in very short supply.150 Most reservations are
ringed by border towns where most of the consumer dollars from
reservations are spent because that is where the closest businesses and
stores are located. Indian nations have long tried to combat these
challenges by operating tribally owned business entities and public sector
dominated economies. In fact, the majority of the economic enterprises
operating in Indian Country are owned and operated by tribal nations.151
Indian nations often operate the standard governmental social welfare
departments and programs with economic objectives in mind, in addition
to the usual policy objectives.152 Indian nations seek to provide jobs and
income on reservations. Tribes also operate a host of businesses that
outside of Indian Country are part of the private sector such as housing
construction, radio stations, gas stations, grocery stores, tourism
enterprises, hunting and fishing activities, casinos, restaurants, and even
laundromats.153
Indian nations engage in governmental and business operations to
generate profits because “few tribes have any significant tax base. Tribal
business enterprises may be the only means by which a tribe can raise
revenues—and thus such enterprises may be essential to the fulfillment of
the tribe’s governmental obligations.”154 In 2014, Justice Sotomayor also
noted that, due to a lack of revenue sources, “tribal business operations
are critical to the goals of tribal self-sufficiency.”155 This point is worth
repeating: Indian nations need to earn profits from economic investments
149. See supra notes 1–3.
150. See Robert J. Miller, Economic Development in Indian Country: Will Capitalism or Socialism
Succeed?, 80 OR. L. REV. 757, 842–43 (2001).
151. See MILLER, RESERVATION “CAPITALISM,” supra note 2, at 138–39.
152. See id. at 50–70, 127–30, 138–39.
153. See Lance Morgan, The Rise of Tribes and the Fall of Federal Indian Law, 49 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
115, 122, & 128 (2017); Ashley Nerbovig, After 10 Years Without, Northern Cheyenne Builds a New
Laundromat, BILLINGS GAZETTE (Sept. 14, 2016), https://billingsgazette.com/business/after-10years-without-northern-cheyenne-builds-new-laundromat/article_1887136c-d493-5ade-a81b3f996566562a.html [https://perma.cc/63YX-2BYY]; MILLER, RESERVATION “CAPITALISM”, supra
note 2, at 49–70; THE HARVARD PROJECT ON AMERICAN INDIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, THE
STATE OF THE NATIVE NATIONS: CONDITIONS UNDER U.S. POLICIES OF SELF-DETERMINATION 111–
21, 145–53, 162–71, 211–12, 256–57 (2008); REBUILDING NATIVE NATIONS, supra note 10, at 3–5;
Miller, supra note 150, at 759–61, 800–01, 817–27.
154. Catherine T. Struve, Tribal Immunity and Tribal Courts, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 137, 169 (2004).
See also Crepelle, supra note 6, at 1020.
155. Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 810 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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and from tribally owned economic entities because they almost totally
lack the ability to acquire income from taxation to fund their governments
like state and federal governments are able to do.156
Similar to many states, tribal governments engage in what can be
considered as public sector endeavours such as gaming, developing
tribally owned timberlands and mineral resources, and tribally owned
farms and cattle and bison ranching companies that utilize tribally owned
lands.157 Other Indian nations own manufacturing facilities and even
slaughterhouses.158 Some tribes have banded together to develop their
resources and hopefully to benefit from economies of scale. The
Intertribal Timber Council in Portland, Oregon, the Council of Energy
Resource Tribes, the InterTribal Buffalo Council, the Intertribal
Agriculture Council are examples of these types of economic activities in
Indian Country.159 Indian governments also operate public utilities to
provide services on reservations and earn profits. For example, the
Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Reservation in Oregon have coowned since 2001 the power-generating Pelton Dam in partnership with
Portland General Electric, and the Confederated Tribes of the Salish and
Kootenai Reservation in Montana own and operate the Kerr Dam and its
156. Miller, RESERVATION “CAPITALISM,” supra note 2; see also Crepelle, supra note 6; Fletcher,
supra note 6.
157. E.g., Kristi Eaton, In South Dakota, a Tribal Nation Owns the Largest Native-Managed
Buffalo Herd in the World, THE DAILY YONDER (March 17, 2022), https://dailyyonder.com/in-southdakota-a-tribal-nation-owns-the-largest-native-managed-buffalo-herd-in-the-world/2022/03/17/
[https://perma.cc/M8T7-F7DD]; Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2721 (2018);
Steve Friess, Indian Tribes Look Beyond Casinos for Income, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 23, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/24/business/indian-tribes-look-beyond-casinos-for-income.html
[https://perma.cc/W3UV-M35T] (marijuana); MILLER, RESERVATION “CAPITALISM,” supra note 2,
at 49–93; Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976) (cigarette sales);
Native Am. Distrib. v. Seneca-Cayuga Tobacco Co., 546 F.3d 1288, 1292 (10th Cir. 2008)
(cigarettes); HARVARD PROJECT, supra note 153, at 111–21, 145–74.
158. QUAPAW CATTLE CO., https://www.quapawtribe.com/511/Quapaw-Cattle-Company
[https://perma.cc/K5RM-T6SA]; Lacey Newlin, Native American Tribes to Build a Bison Processing
Plant, HIGH PLAINS J. (July 10, 2019), https://www.hpj.com/livestock/native-american-tribes-tobuild-a-bison-processing-plant/article_d149a37e-9f42-11e9-b5ec-0790c47b0dde.html
[https://perma.cc/8HM2-45Y4]; Morgan, supra note 153, at 128; RESERVATION “CAPITALISM,”
supra note 2, at 52; HARVARD PROJECT, supra note 153, at 112; REBUILDING NATIVE NATIONS, supra
note 10, at 4–5; Altheimer & Gray v. Sioux Mfg. Corp., 983 F.2d 803, 806 (7th Cir. 1993) (finding
that Devils Lake Sioux Tribe created tribally owned corporation to address 45% unemployment rate
and manufacture military camouflage cloth and helmets).
159. INTERTRIBAL TIMBER COUNCIL, https://www.itcnet.org/ [https://perma.cc/JGX9-LD4E];
ROGER FRAGUA, COUNCIL OF ENERGY RESOURCE TRIBES, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY COOPERATIVE
AGREEMENT
GRANT
#DE-FG36-03GO13039
(2005),
https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2016/01/f28/0510review_02fragua.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BWA6-KLTB];
INTER
TRIBAL
BUFFALO
COUNCIL,
https://americanindian.si.edu/nk360/plains-belonging/itbc
[https://perma.cc/R5LJ-PQX7];
INTERTRIBAL AGRICULTURE COUNCIL, https://www.indianag.org/ [https://perma.cc/HXP9-8SS9].
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electrical generation system.160
In addition to taxing products like tobacco, alcohol, and fuels, for
example, several tribal nations are actively involved in earning profits by
manufacturing and selling cigarettes, cannabis, hemp, alcohol, and
gasoline.161 In these situations, tribal governments are attempting to make
profits in lieu of taxes by operating a wide variety of businesses. Often,
tribal nations have had to exercise their sovereign rights or look to
Congress and the federal courts to fend off state attempts to inhibit their
economic endeavours.162 States and non-Indian business entities are often
jealous of competition from successful tribal enterprises.163
In the past decade, a few Indian nations have entered the high-interest
online lending industry in their attempts to attract jobs and economic
activities to their reservations.164 Plaintiffs have sued these tribal business
160. Pat Kruis, Confederated Tribes Now Own 49.9% Interest in Pelton Dam, PAMPLIN MEDIA
GROUP: THE MADRAS PIONEER (Jan. 27, 2022), https://pamplinmedia.com/msp/129-news/534520427791-confederated-tribes-now-own-499-interest-in-pelton-dam- [https://perma.cc/PT8P-FY2L];
Jack McNeel, Salish-Kootenai Dam: First Tribally Owned Hydro-Electric Dam in U.S., INDIAN
COUNTRY TODAY (Sept. 13, 2018), https://indiancountrytoday.com/archive/salish-kootenai-damfirst-tribally-owned-hydro-electric-dam-in-us [https://perma.cc/7X72-9U97].
161. E.g.,
Tribal
Hemp
Initiative,
ANISHINAABE
AGRIC.
INST.,
http://anishinaabeagriculture.org/tribal-hemp-initiative [https://perma.cc/REK9-7Y94]; Christopher
Helman, The Inside Story of the First (Legal) Native American Distillery, FORBES (Aug. 17, 2020,
6:30 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/christopherhelman/2020/08/17/the-inside-story-of-the-firstlegal-native-american-distillery/?sh=2c9922c43412 [https://perma.cc/2A5Z-NQGN]; Kathleen
Willcox, Behind the Rise of Native American Wines, WINE ENTHUSIAST (Nov. 15, 2019),
https://www.winemag.com/2019/11/15/behind-the-rise-of-native-american-wines/
[https://perma.cc/V22U-HEW3] (highlighting several wine-making tribes); Richard Walker, More
Tribal Governments Considering Cannabis Operations, KITSAP DAILY NEWS (Apr. 11, 2017, 1:30
AM)
https://www.kitsapdailynews.com/business/more-tribal-governments-considering-cannabisoperations/ [https://perma.cc/759N-6YRW] (Squaxin Island and Suquamish Tribes); Ty Rushing,
Nebraska Factory Makes 1.1B Cigarettes a Year, U.S. NEWS (April 29, 2017, 1:05 AM),
https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/nebraska/articles/2017-04-29/nebraska-factory-makes11b-cigarettes-a-year (last visited July 26, 2022) (Winnebago Tribe); Melinda Smith, Comment,
Native Americans and the Legalization of Marijuana: Can the Tribes Turn Another Addiction into
Affluence?, 39 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 507 (2014).
162. See Morgan, supra note 153; California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202,
221–22 (1987); Miller v. Wright, 705 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that sovereign immunity
protected tribe and its officials from suit opposing its cigarette tax).
163. See MILLER, RESERVATION “CAPITALISM,” supra note 2, at 74–77; Prevent All Cigarette
Trafficking (PACT) Act, BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES (Dec. 21,
2021),
https://www.atf.gov/alcohol-tobacco/prevent-all-cigarette-trafficking-act-pact-2009
[https://perma.cc/9HVN-SREY]; Gale Courey Toensing, Senate Passes ‘Termination Era’ PACT
Act; Tribal Leaders Will Continue Fight, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (Sept. 12, 2018),
https://indiancountrytoday.com/archive/senate-passes-termination-era-pact-act-tribal-leaders-willcontinue-fight [https://perma.cc/HES4-J2ZQ] (the PACT Act “bans the shipment of tobacco products
through the U.S. Postal Service, cutting off the only remaining delivery service for Indian retailers
doing business over the Internet”).
164. See Williams v. Big Picture Loans, LLC, 929 F.3d 170, 174 (4th Cir. 2019); People v. Miami
Nation Enters., 386 P.3d 357, 361 (Cal. 2016). These cases are addressed infra in section II.C.
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entities, leading to several of the sovereign immunity cases we discuss
below in section II.C. The Indian gaming industry has also been met with
this same intense level of state and individual opposition since its
inception.165
This brief survey demonstrates that tribal governments have long
sought to address the unemployment and poverty issues in Indian Country
by pursuing a wide variety of economic activities. In the past few decades,
several Indian nations have been spectacularly successful with gaming
and others have succeeded with specific economic enterprises. But the
vast majority of tribes and Native communities continue to struggle to
provide living wage jobs and adequate housing, healthcare, and education
for their peoples.
C.

Judicial Interference

So-called “arms-of-the-tribe” entities—formed by Indian nations to
perform governmental or even purely commercial activities, such as
governmental departments, agencies, or tribally owned corporations—
benefit from tribal sovereign immunity for operations that occur on or off
reservations.166 “Agencies and enterprises of an Indian tribe are equivalent
to the tribe itself for purposes of jurisdictional analysis.”167 Thus, tribal
departments, administrative agencies, and quasi-independent entities and
businesses can enjoy immunity protections.168
In recent decades, however, some state and federal courts have adopted
significant changes that have affected this general rule and have interfered
with tribal decisions about entity formation, management, and even the
actual day-to-day operations of a variety of tribal governmental and
economic activities. In doing so, these courts seem to be straying outside
165. See MILLER, RESERVATION “CAPITALISM,” supra note 2, at 74–77, 83–84; Seminole Tribe of
Florida v. Butterworth, 658 F.2d 310, 311–12 (5th Cir. 1981).
166. Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 824 n.4 (2014) (Thomas, J., dissenting);
Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 760 (1998); Long v. Snoqualmie Gaming Comm’n,
7 Wash. App. 672, 675–80, 435 P.3d 339, 341–44 (2019) (dismissing case in which former CEO of
tribe’s casino sued tribal gaming commission; case dismissed due to commission possessing
sovereign immunity); Miller, 705 F.3d at 923–24; Native Am. Distrib. v. Seneca-Cayuga Tobacco
Co., 546 F.3d 1288, 1292 (10th Cir. 2008) (“Tribal immunity extends to subdivisions of a tribe, and
even bars suits arising from a tribe’s commercial activities.”).
167. Warm Springs Forest Prod. Indus. v. Emp. Benefits Ins. Co., 703 P.2d 1008, 1009 n.1 (Or. Ct.
App. 1985), aff’d, 716 P.2d 740 (Or. 1986).
168. Williams, 929 F.3d at 174 (dismissing case due to arm of the tribe sovereign immunity); White
v. Univ. of Cal., 765 F.3d 1010, 1025 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Tribal sovereign immunity not only protects
tribes themselves, but also extends to arms of the tribe acting on behalf of the tribe.”); Weeks Constr.,
Inc. v. Oglala Sioux Hous. Auth., 797 F.2d 668, 670–71 (8th Cir. 1986); Long, 7 Wash. App. at 675,
435 P.3d at 341 (dismissing case due to tribal gaming commission possessing sovereign immunity);
Wilson v. Alaska Native Tribal Health Consortium, 399 F. Supp. 3d 926, 936 (D. Alaska 2019).
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their areas of expertise and authority. They have, in effect, substituted
their own ill-informed policy and economic judgments for tribal decisionmaking on how Indian nations must establish and operate their businesses
if the tribe and its entities are to enjoy the protections and economic
advantages of sovereign immunity the same as federal and state
governments. These courts have developed multi-factor tests to determine
when and if tribally owned governmental departments, agencies, and
commercial entities enjoy sovereign immunity. We examine the leading
and most recent cases in this section.
1.

Ransom (N.Y. 1995) and Sue/Perior (N.Y. 2014)

In 1995, the New York Court of Appeals created a multi-factor test to
analyze the arm of the tribe issue raised in Ransom v. St. Regis Mohawk
Education & Community Fund, Inc.169 In that case, the St. Regis Mohawk
Tribe had created the St. Regis Mohawk Education and Community Fund
as a nonprofit corporation under the Nonprofit Corporation Act of the
District of Columbia.170 The purpose of the Fund was to provide
education, health care, social, and historical services to residents of the
Tribe’s reservation.171 Plaintiffs sued the Fund for wrongful discharge and
the defendant moved to dismiss the suit due to sovereign immunity.172
The New York court developed nine factors to determine whether the
Tribe’s non-profit entity was an arm of the tribe entitled to immunity:
1. The entity is organized under the tribe’s laws or constitution
rather than federal law;
2. The organization’s purposes are similar to or serve those of the
tribal government;
3. The organization’s governing body is comprised mainly of
tribal officials;
4. The tribe has legal title or ownership of property used by the
organization;
5. Tribal officials exercise control over the administration or
accounting activities of the organization;
6. The tribe’s governing body has power to dismiss members of
the organization’s governing body;
7. The corporate entity generates its own revenue;
8. A suit against the corporation will impact the tribe’s fiscal
169. 658 N.E.2d 989, 992 (N.Y. 1995).
170. Id. at 991.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 991–92.
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resources;
9. The sub-entity has the power to bind or obligate the funds of
the tribe.173
Four of the nine factors related to the Tribe’s ownership, control, and
operation of the entity:
the organization’s governing body is comprised mainly of tribal
officials; the tribe has legal title or ownership of property used by
the organization; tribal officials exercise control
over
the
administration or accounting activities of the organization; and
the tribe’s governing body has the power to dismiss members of
the organization’s governing body.174
After analyzing these factors, the court held that the Fund enjoyed
sovereign immunity because
[c]ritically, under its by-laws, the Fund’s governing body may
only be comprised of elected Chiefs of the Tribe. Thus, the Fund’s
provision of social services on behalf of and under the direct fiscal
and administrative control of the Tribe renders it an entity so
closely allied with and dependent upon the tribe that it is entitled
to the protection of tribal sovereign immunity.175
The Fund was thus an arm of the tribe and protected.176
In 2014, the New York Court of Appeals was faced with the issue of
whether a subsidiary of a tribally owned corporation enjoyed immunity in
Sue/Perior Concrete & Paving, Inc. v. Lewiston Golf Course Corp.177 In
this appeal, a contractor had sued a tribal corporation formed under the
laws of the Seneca Nation of Indians in regards the construction of a golf
course to be operated by that corporation for the benefit of the Nation.178
This court cited Ransom and used its multi-factor approach to determine
whether the golf course corporation was an entity separated from the
Nation’s immunity.179 The Sue/Perior court relied on Ransom’s
“functions or purposes” factor, and made this rather remarkable statement:
[T]he primary purpose of creating the golf course . . . was to act
as a regional economic engine and thereby serve the profitmaking interests of the Seneca Nation’s casino
operations . . . . While this may result in more funds for
173. Id. at 992.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 993.
176. Id.
177. 25 N.E.3d 928 (N.Y. 2014).
178. Id. at 931.
179. Id. at 932–33.
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government projects on the Seneca Nation’s reservations and
elsewhere that benefit members of the tribe, we agree with the
Appellate Division that the purposes of Lewiston Golf were
sufficiently different from tribal goals that they militate against
Lewiston Golf’s claim of sovereign immunity.180
The court also looked to the other eight Ransom factors and agreed that
several cut in favor of the tribal corporation’s argument.181 But the 4-3
majority felt that the most important factors leaned in the opposite
direction. These facts included that the Seneca Nation did not take legal
title or ownership of the golf course.182 Most significantly, the court noted
that the “record firmly indicates the intent to ensure that a suit against
Lewiston Golf will not impact the Seneca Nation’s fiscal resources” and
that the Nation “would not be liable for the debts or obligations incurred
by [the golf course].”183 The Nation argued, however, that the lawsuit
against the golf course would have an economic impact on the Seneca
Nation because revenues that would otherwise be distributed to the Nation
and its citizens would be diminished by the suit.184 The majority of the
court responded that whether the profits would have been distributed to
the Seneca Nation “is beside the point. The test, with respect to the
financial relationship factors of Ransom, is not the indirect effects of any
liability on the tribe’s income, but rather whether the immediate
obligations are assumed by the tribe.”185 Ultimately, the court held that
the tribal entity did not possess sovereign immunity because the most
significant Ransom factors counted against a finding of immunity.186 The
three dissenting justices, however, argued that the Seneca Nation would
lose much needed revenues, the Nation had the sovereign rights to
organize its economic entities as it saw fit, and that this litigation would
impact the tribal treasury.187
180. Id. at 934 (emphasis added).
181. Id.
182. Id. at 934–35.
183. Id. at 935 (quotations omitted).
184. Id.
185. Id. (noting also the “effect on tribal treasuries, just as ‘the vulnerability of the State’s purse’
is considered ‘the most salient factor’ in determinations of a State’s Eleventh Amendment immunity”
(quoting Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 48 (1994))).
186. Id. at 937.
187. Id. at 940–43 (Rivera, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Nation created Lewiston Golf as a commercial
business venture to increase the Nation’s gaming revenues for the benefit of the Tribe and its
members. . . . As a sovereign, the Nation is certainly able to decide that this corporate arrangement
will enhance its economic independence . . . . Lewiston Golf is intended . . . to ‘further[] . . . the
economic success of the Nation’s gaming operations.’ . . . We should look to whether the corporate
entity furthers tribal self-determination and self-governance, and as such, benefits the tribe’s
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Breakthrough (10th Cir. 2010)

Federal circuit courts have also been faced with arm-of-the-tribe issues
and questions about sovereign immunity. They have also developed and
applied multi-factor tests to answer those questions. Perhaps the most
influential federal case is the Tenth Circuit 2010 decision regarding
immunity and a tribal casino in Breakthrough Mgmt. Grp., Inc. v.
Chukchansi Gold Casino and Resort.188
In Breakthrough, the Picayune Rancheria of the Chukchansi Indians
had created a separate tribal corporation, the Chukchansi Economic
Development Authority (“Authority”), to own and operate the casino for
the Rancheria.189 A plaintiff sued the Rancheria, the Authority, the casino,
and individual defendants. The federal district court dismissed the
Rancheria due to sovereign immunity but allowed the suit to proceed
against the Authority and casino.190 The Tenth Circuit then developed a
six-factor test that it used to analyze and answer whether the Authority,
created by the Rancheria, and the casino, owned and operated by the
Authority, were arms of the tribe and protected by sovereign immunity.
The Tenth Circuit factors are:
1. The method of creating the economic entity;
2. The organization’s purpose;
3. The organization’s structure, ownership, and management,
including the amount of control the tribe has over the entity;
4. Whether the tribe intended the entity to have sovereign
immunity;
5. The financial relationship between the tribe and the entity;
6. Whether the purposes of tribal immunity are served by
granting immunity to the entity.191
In analyzing its factors, the Tenth Circuit was not overly impressed by
the extent of the actual tribal control and operation of the Authority and
the casino. The court did note that the members of the Authority’s board
of directors were all tribal citizens and “also are sitting members of the
Tribal Council.”192 Thus the court emphasized that the tribal council was
members. . . . [T]he court in Ransom recognized, ‘preserving tribal resources and tribal autonomy are
matters of vital importance.’” (quoting Ransom v. St. Regis Mohawk Educ. & Cmty. Fund, Inc, 86
N.Y.2d 553, 560–61 (1995))).
188. 629 F.3d 1173 (10th Cir. 2010). The California Supreme Court called Breakthrough the most
influential case in this emerging field. People v. Miami Nation Enters., 386 P.3d 537, 367 (Cal. 2016).
189. Breakthrough, 629 F.3d at 1176–77.
190. Id. at 1177.
191. Id. at 1181.
192. Id. at 1193.

Miller (Do Not Delete)

2022]

11/2/22 10:49 PM

TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY AND EFFICIENCY

811

“identical to the Authority’s Board” and that the tribal
“Chairperson . . . also acts as the Chairperson of the Authority.”193 But the
court was still concerned that the chief financial officer of the Authority,
and the general manager and chief financial officer of the casino “[were]
not tribal [citizens]. Moreover, the Casino itself [had] fifteen directors,
twelve of whom [were] not Tribal members.”194 In light of these facts the
court stated: “The third factor in our analysis, the structure, ownership,
and management of the Authority and the Casino, weighs both for and
against a finding of immunity.”195
Notwithstanding its concerns about the tribal control, the court
dismissed the suit against the Authority and the casino because: “After
considering these factors, it is patent to us that the Authority and the
Casino are so closely related to the Tribe that they should share in the
Tribe’s sovereign immunity.”196 The court stated that “the balance of the
factors weighs . . . strongly in favor of immunity.”197 Consequently, the
Tenth Circuit held that the Authority and the casino were arms-of-thetribe and protected by sovereign immunity.198
Fourteen years earlier, a different tribal casino was also found immune
from suit under a three-factor test. In 1996, the Minnesota Supreme Court
also dismissed a suit versus a tribal casino due to sovereign immunity. In
Gavle v. Little Six, Inc.,199 the plaintiff sued Little Six, Inc. and three
officers for torts claims regarding her employment at the casino. Little Six
is a tribal corporation that was created under the laws of the Shakopee
Mdewakanton Sioux Community to operate its casino.200 The state
supreme court affirmed the lower court decision dismissing the suit
because the sovereign immunity of the tribal Community extended to its
casino.201 The Minnesota Supreme Court analyzed three factors that it
developed to answer this issue and held that the casino was a tribally
owned business entity, formed to enhance the well-being of the
Community, and was closely linked to it in governance. Consequently,
the tribal casino was immune from suit.202
The court used these three factors to determine “whether tribal
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 1177–78, 1181, 1195.
197. Id. at 1191 n.13.
198. Id. at 1181, 1195.
199. 555 N.W.2d 284 (Minn. 1996).
200. Id. at 287.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 287, 295–96.
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sovereign immunity extends to a tribal business entity:”
1. Whether the business entity is organized for a purpose that is
governmental in nature, rather than commercial;
2. Whether the tribe and the business entity are closely linked in
governing structure and other characteristics;
3. Whether federal policies intended to promote Indian tribal
autonomy are furthered by the extension of immunity to the
business entity.203
In regard to these factors, the court noted that the casino was “owned
wholly by the Community, as a governmental unit . . . [and the] Board of
Directors must include at least three members of the Community Business
Council and a majority of the Board of Directors must be members of the
Community.”204 This court had no trouble holding “[t]here is, therefore, a
close link between the Community and the management of [the
casino].”205
3.

White (9th Cir. 2014)

In 2014, in White v. University of California,206 the Ninth Circuit was
asked whether an inter-tribal consortium of individuals, the Kumeyaay
Cultural Repatriation Committee, whose individual members had been
appointed by twelve separate federally recognized tribal governments,
shared the sovereign immunity protection of their associated Indian
nations.207 The Committee had been created to protect the tribes’ rights to
repatriation of human remains, funerary objects, and cultural artifacts
under the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act of
1990.208
In this situation, the University of California had decided to repatriate
ancient human remains to the Committee and tribes.209 Several professors
and scientists sued the University system, state officials, and the
Committee to be allowed to study these remains instead of the University
repatriating them.210 But the Ninth Circuit panel ultimately held that the
Committee was an arm of the tribe and protected by the tribes’ sovereign
immunity, and thus the professors’ suit was dismissed because the
203. Id. at 294.
204. Id. at 295.
205. Id.
206. 765 F.3d 1010 (9th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 983 (2016).
207. Id. at 1015 & n.1, 1016, 1018.
208. Id. at 1025; 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001–3013 (2018).
209. White, 765 F.3d at 1021.
210. Id. at 1021–22.
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Committee and the tribes were indispensable parties who could not be
joined in the suit.211 To analyze this issue, the court reviewed the six-factor
Tenth Circuit Breakthrough test and then adopted for the Ninth Circuit a
five-factor test:
1. Method of the creation of the economic entity;
2. The entity’s purpose;
3. The entity’s structure, ownership, management, and amount of
tribal control;
4. The tribe’s intent with respect to sharing its sovereign
immunity with the entity;
5. The financial relationship between the tribe and the entity.212
This court refused to adopt the sixth Breakthrough factor of whether the
purposes of sovereign immunity would be served by granting immunity
to this entity. After analyzing the facts regarding the creation of the
Committee in light of its five-factor test, the Ninth Circuit held that the
consortium was protected by tribal sovereign immunity.213
4.

Miami Nation (Cal. S. Ct. 2016)

In 2016, the California Supreme Court was faced with the question of
whether online lending corporations, created and allegedly controlled by
two Indian nations, shared the tribes’ immunity from being sued for
injunctive relief, restitution, and civil penalties.214 The California court
analyzed the developing body of case law set out above and adopted its
own five-factor test to assess whether these business entities were armsof-the-tribe and possessed sovereign immunity. The court adopted “a
modified version of the Tenth Circuit’s Breakthrough test” and used
factors one through five of Breakthrough’s six-part test.215
1. [T]he entity’s method of creation,
2. [W]hether the tribe intended the entity to share in its immunity,
3. [T]he entity’s purpose,
4. [T]he tribe’s control over the entity, and
5. [T]he financial relationship between the tribe and the entity.216
In this case, the state of California sued multiple payday lenders for
211. Id. at 1025–27.
212. Id. at 1025 (quoting Breakthrough Mgmt. Grp., Inc. v. Chukchansi Gold Casino & Resort, 629
F.3d 1173, 1187 (10th Cir. 2010)).
213. Id. at 1015, 1025.
214. See People v. Miami Nation Enters., 386 P.3d 357 (Cal. 2016).
215. Id. at 371.
216. Id. at 365.
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injunctive relief, restitution, and civil penalties for violating state lending
laws.217 Two of the lenders were controlled by the Santee Sioux Tribe and
the Miami Nation and they moved to quash service of summons based on
the state court’s lack of jurisdiction due to sovereign immunity.218 An
individual operator had contracted with these two tribes to offer the online
lending services.219 The California Supreme Court analyzed many cases,
including Ransom, Sue/Perior, Breakthrough, White, and Gavle, and
applied its multi-factor test to determine if these payday lending entities
were arms of the tribe and protected by immunity.220
The factor that seemed to weigh most heavily in the court’s decision
was the “control” factor. The court described the test to determine actual
tribal control of a tribally owned business entity in this way:
[T]he control factor examines the degree to which the tribe
actually, not just nominally, directs the entity’s
activities . . . . This factor concerns the entity’s “structure,
ownership, and management, including the amount of control the
Tribe has over the entities.” Relevant considerations include the
entity’s formal governance structure, the extent to which it is
owned by the tribe, and the entity’s day-to-day management. An
entity’s decision to outsource management to a nontribal third
party is not enough, standing alone, to tilt this factor against
immunity. As the Minnesota Supreme Court has observed,
“control of a corporation need not mean control of business
minutiae; the tribe can be enmeshed in the direction and control
of the business without being involved in the actual
management.” If the tribe retains some ownership and formal
control over the entity but has contracted out its management, this
factor may weigh either for or against immunity depending on the
particular facts of the case. Evidence that the tribe actively directs
or oversees the operation of the entity weighs in favor of
immunity; evidence that the tribe is a passive owner, neglects its
governance roles, or otherwise exercises little or no control or

217. Id. at 362.
218. Id.; cf. Cash Advance & Preferred Cash Loans v. Colorado, 242 P.3d 1099, 1102 (Colo. 2010)
(holding that if business entities were “arms of the tribe” they could use sovereign immunity to defend
against state investigative subpoenas. The court remanded and directed the trial court to use these
three factors to determine whether the entities were arms-of-the-tribes: 1. Whether the tribes created
the entities pursuant to tribal law; 2. whether the tribes own and operate the entities; and 3. whether
the entities’ immunity protects the tribe’s sovereignty.).
219. Miami Nation, 386 P.3d at 362.
220. Id. at 366–67, 376–79.
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oversight weighs against immunity.221
In analyzing this factor, the court stated that “[t]he record . . . contains
scant evidence that either tribe actually controls, oversees, or significantly
benefits from the underlying business operations of the online lenders.”222
The court also stated:
[M]embers of the Santee Sioux’s governing Tribal Council serve
as the SFS board of directors. MNE’s board of directors is
appointed by the chief of the Miami Tribe with the advice and
consent of the Tribal Business Committee . . . . [But] significant
evidence suggests that in fact neither . . . the Miami Tribe or
Santee Sioux, maintains operational control over the underlying
lending businesses.
Both [tribal entities] have relied heavily on outsiders to manage
their online . . . businesses since those businesses were
founded.223
The court noted “other evidence casts doubt on whether SFS’s and MNE
Services’ role in approving loans indicates a significant degree of [tribal]
control.”224 The evidence demonstrated that the majority of the operations
were conducted outside of tribal lands, by non-Indian, non-tribally
employed employees.225 The court then concluded that “the balance of
evidence suggests that [non-Indians] exercised a high degree of practical
control over the online lenders here and that the tribes were not ‘enmeshed
in the direction and control of the business[es].’”226
Consequently, the California Supreme Court determined that the
Santee Sioux Tribe and Miami Nation did not actually control and operate
the lending companies and that in fact the individual non-Indian operator
did.227 The court held “neither [tribally owned entity] has shown by a
preponderance of the evidence that it is entitled to tribal immunity as an
arm of its affiliated tribe.”228 The entities did not benefit from their tribes’
sovereign immunity and could not avoid the state summons. The court
remanded the matter, however, for the trial court to expand the record, and
221. Id. at 371, 373 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting Gavle v. Little Six, Inc., 555
N.W.2d 284, 295 (Minn. 1996)).
222. Id. at 376.
223. Id. (emphasis added).
224. Id. at 377.
225. See id.
226. Id. (quoting Gavle, 555 N.W.2d at 295); see also id. at 378 (“Neither [tribal entity] has carried
its burden of demonstrating practical control by either tribe or a close financial relationship between
either tribe and the lending businesses.” (emphasis added)).
227. Id. at 378–79.
228. Id. at 379.
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to apply the newly articulated multi-factor test to any evidence produced
by the parties.229
5.

Williams (4th Cir. 2019)

In 2019, the Fourth Circuit was also faced with the issue of whether
tribally owned online lending businesses were entitled to immunity from
a suit alleging violations of Virginia’s usury laws. In Williams v. Big
Picture Loans, LLC,230 the court also considered and adopted five of the
six-factors from the Breakthrough test. “Like the Ninth Circuit, we adopt
the first five Breakthrough factors to analyze arm-of-the-tribe sovereign
immunity”:231
1. The method of creation;
2. Purpose of the entity;
3. The tribe’s ownership and the control it exercises over the
entity’s management;
4. The tribal intent to share sovereign immunity with the entity;
5. The financial relationship between the tribe and the entity.232
In this case, the Lac Vieux Desert Band of the Lake Superior Chippewa
Indians in northern Michigan had formed two business entities to offer
online lending.233 Virginia plaintiffs sued the businesses and various
individuals alleging the high-interest loans were illegal.234 The tribal
entities moved to dismiss claiming immunity as arms-of-the-tribe.235 The
district court denied the motion because it found they had failed to prove
they were entitled to sovereign immunity.236
After adopting the Ninth Circuit’s multi-factor test, the Fourth Circuit
addressed the control and management factor:
The third Breakthrough factor examines the structure, ownership,
and management of the entities, “including the amount of control
the Tribe has over the entities.” Relevant to this factor are the
entities’ formal governance structure, the extent to which the
entities are owned by the tribe, and the day-to-day management

229. Id.
230. 929 F.3d 170 (4th Cir. 2019).
231. Id. at 177.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 174.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
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of the entities.237
The Fourth Circuit examined and emphasized the fact that Big Picture
was managed by two elected tribal council members, who were appointed
to those positions by a majority vote of the elected tribal council.238 These
tribal council managers were granted broad authority to legally bind Big
Picture and to perform all actions necessary to carry out its business.239
The circuit court stated that the “district court correctly recognized that
this general structure is to assure that Big Picture is answerable to the
Tribe at every level, which supports immunity.”240 The Fourth Circuit was
not overly concerned that the other defendant company, Ascension,
“manage[d] many of the day-to-day activities associated with Big
Picture’s lending, [because] an entity’s decision to outsource management
in and of itself does not weigh against tribal immunity, as the district court
recognized.”241 The court then found that the Tribe through Big Picture
“remain[ed] in control of its essential functions” and limited the authority
of Ascension in significant ways.242 The court cited Miami Nation and
agreed with the California Supreme Court that simply because some “dayto-day management tasks” were outsourced to Ascension does “not in
itself weigh against immunity, given the other evidence of Tribal
control.”243
Ultimately, the Fourth Circuit stated that the control factor question
was a closer call as to the defendant Ascension than for Big Picture.244
And it noted that even though the Tribe owned Ascension, and there was
significant tribal council and tribal council members’ management of
Ascension, the evidence tended to weigh slightly against a finding of armof-the-tribe status and immunity for Ascension.245 But after analyzing and
weighing all five factors, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court and
held that Big Picture Loans, LLC and Ascension Technologies, LLC were
arms-of-the-tribe, protected by sovereign immunity, and not subject to
being sued.246

237. Id. at 182 (emphasis added) (quoting Breakthrough Mgmt. Grp., Inc. v. Chukchansi Gold
Casino & Resort, 629 F.3d 1173, 1191 (10th Cir. 2010)).
238. Id. at 182–83.
239. Id. at 182.
240. Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).
241. Id. at 182–83 (citing People v. Miami Nation Enters., 386 P.3d 357, 373 (Cal. 2016)).
242. Id. at 183–84.
243. Id. at 183 (citing Miami Nation, 386 P.3d at 373).
244. Id.
245. Id. at 183–84.
246. Id. at 185.
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Hwal’Bay Ba (Ariz. S. Ct. 2020)

In 2020, the Arizona Supreme Court analyzed its own precedent, and
the Breakthrough and Miami Nation cases in particular, and adopted a
multi-factor test to decide when a tribal business entity shares the Indian
nation’s immunity. In Hwal’Bay Ba: J Enterprises v. Jantzen in & for
Mohave,247 the court set forth this six-part test:
1. The entity’s creation and business form;
2. The entity’s purpose;
3. The business relationship between the tribe and the entity
(including the structure, management, and ownership of the
entity);
4. The tribe’s intent to share immunity with the entity;
5. The financial relationship between the entity and the tribe;
6. Whether providing immunity to the entity will further federal
policies underlying sovereign immunity.248
In Hwal’Bay Ba, the plaintiff sued the Hualapai Indian Tribe and its
corporate entities for injuries she suffered on a rafting trip.249 The Tribe is
the sole shareholder and owner of the Grand Canyon Resort Corporation
(“GCRC”), and Hwal’Bay Ba: J Enterprises, Inc. does business under the
trade name of GCRC to operate rafting trips.250 The state trial court
dismissed the Tribe due to sovereign immunity but did not grant immunity
to the tribal corporate entities.251 The Arizona Supreme Court applied its
new six-factor test to determine if these business entities were arms of the
tribe.252
In discussing its factor on the Tribe’s ownership, control, and operation
of GCRC and Hwal’Bay Ba, the court stated:
This inquiry should illuminate the tribe’s ownership interest and
the amount of control exercised by it over the entity’s affairs.
“Control” does not require directing day-to-day operations but
addresses the tribe’s involvement in the direction and control of
the entity. “Evidence that the tribe actively directs or oversees the
operation of the entity weighs in favor of immunity; evidence that
the tribe is a passive owner, neglects its governance roles, or
otherwise exercises little or no control or oversight weighs
247. 458 P.3d 102 (Ariz. 2020).
248. Id. at 108–10.
249. Id. at 105.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 105–06.
252. Id. at 108–11.
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against immunity.”253
The court, however, seems to have then ignored the above view of the
control factor that a Tribe does not have to direct the day-to-day
operations of its entities:
[C]ontrol and operation of GCRC is vested in a board of
directors, which can hire officers, make investment decisions,
borrow funds, and enter in contracts; . . . and the Tribe is
prohibited from “interfer[ing] with or giv[ing] orders or
instructions to the officers or employees of GCRC” regarding
day-to-day operations . . . . And nothing reflects the level of
control and oversight the Tribe actually exercises over GCRC as
the plan of operation authorizes the Tribe to do.254
The Arizona Supreme Court then held that the tribally owned
corporation had failed to demonstrate it was an arm of the tribe and
protected by sovereign immunity because the Tribe was not in control and
operation of the business.255 The court remanded the matter, however, for
further development of the record in light of the new six-factor test
adopted by the court.256
It seems important to note that a federal district court in California
arrived at the exact opposite conclusion regarding sovereign immunity for
this identical Tribe and tribal corporation in a tort action just over a month
before the Hwal’Bay Ba decision was issued.257 The California federal
district judge applied the Ninth Circuit White five-factor test and held that
the tribal corporation was protected by immunity.258 In addition, there are
two Arizona Court of Appeals cases from 2009 concerning an injury on a
rafting trip with the identical Tribe and tribal corporations and defendants
in Hwal’Bay Ba, and a 2020 case—again in regard to the identical Tribe
and tribal corporation—in which these state appellate courts came to
different conclusions than the Arizona Supreme Court did in Hwal’Bay

253. Id. at 109 (emphasis added) (quoting People v. Miami Nation Enters., 386 P.3d 357, 373 (Cal.
2016)).
254. Id. at 111 (emphasis added). The facts the Arizona Supreme Court criticized are the very
principles that the Harvard Project has been advising Indian nations to do for the past thirty plus years.
See, e.g., REBUILDING NATIVE NATIONS, supra note 10, at 150 (“Political leaders should do what they
were elected to do—run the government—but they shouldn’t be directly managing it.”).
255. Hwal’Bay Ba, 458 P.3d at 110.
256. Id. at 111.
257. Min Zhang v. Grand Canyon Resort Corp., No. 5:19-cv-00124-SVW-SP, 2020 WL 1000608,
at *1–2 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 2020) (granting motion to dismiss for the same defendant from Hwal’Bay
Ba, the Hualapai Indian Tribe wholly owned Grand Canyon Resort Corporation, due to sovereign
immunity in a pro se case).
258. Id. at *2.
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Ba.259 The Arizona Supreme Court did not cite, and perhaps did not
consider, any of these three cases in deciding Hwal’Bay Ba.
In conclusion, this Part has laid out briefly the existence of tribal
sovereignty and governance both before and after the colonial eras and the
enactment of the U.S. Constitution and creation of the United States.
Indian nations have always exercised varying amounts of political power
and jurisdiction over their peoples and territories. That existence and
authority arises from the compacts of their peoples and not from the
United States or the states. For over one hundred and fifty years, federal
courts have recognized that the protection of sovereign immunity is an
inherent aspect of tribal sovereignty. Indian nations have utilized and
oftentimes waived their immunity to operate a wide array of economic
entities and activities in their attempts to bring beneficial jobs, housing,
and healthcare to their communities. This also demonstrates, however,
what can be described as a new trend of judicial interference into tribal
decision-making regarding the creation, management, and operation of
their business entities.
These cases show that numerous courts have developed very similar
multi-factor tests to analyze whether a tribal department, agency, or
business entity is an arm of the tribe and thus protected by immunity. One
can reasonably argue that these tests and these court decisions are
examples of the state and federal judiciaries interfering in tribal legislative
and executive branch decisions. Instead, tribal governments should have
the inherent sovereign right to create, manage, and operate their
businesses and economic entities as Native nations determine best.
Furthermore, they should still enjoy the immunity protections inherent to
sovereign Indian nations and to the federal and state governments.260
259. WD at the Canyon, LLC. v. Honga, No. 1 CA-CV 16-0468, 2017 WL 5404369, ¶¶ 13–19
(Ariz. Ct. App. Nov. 14, 2017) (affirming dismissal of complaint against tribal members, board
members, executives, and elected tribal leaders regarding the operation of a tourist attraction on the
Hualapai Tribe Reservation because defendants were protected by sovereign immunity by acting
within their authority as elected tribal council members and board members or executives of the tribal
corporation Hwal’Bay Ba: J Enterprises, Inc. d/b/a Grand Canyon Resort Corporation); Rosenberg v.
Hualapai Indian Nation, No. 1 CA-CV 08-0135, 2009 WL 757436, ¶¶ 2, 7–8, 10, 12, 17 (Ariz. Ct.
App. Mar. 24, 2009), (affirming dismissal of complaint against Tribe due to sovereign immunity for
an injury incurred on a rafting trip with Hualapai River Runners which was owned and operated by
the Tribe), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 1036 (2010).
260. Cf. Williams v. Big Picture Loans, LLC, 929 F.3d 170 (4th Cir. 2019); White v. Univ. of Cal.,
765 F.3d 1010, 1025 (9th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 577 U.S. 1124 (2016); Breakthrough Mgmt. Grp.,
Inc. v. Chukchansi Gold Casino & Resort, 629 F.3d 1173 (10th Cir. 2010); McCoy v. Salish Kootenai
Coll., Inc., 785 F. App’x 414 (9th Cir. 2019) (finding that even though tribal college was incorporated
under Montana law, college was protected by tribal sovereign immunity); Ninigret Dev. Corp. v.
Narragansett Indian Wetuomuck Hous. Auth., 207 F.3d 21, 29 (1st Cir. 2000) (tribal housing authority
“as an arm of the Tribe, enjoys the full extent of the Tribe’s sovereign immunity”); Wilson v. Alaska
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III. ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY, TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY AND
BUSINESS, AND THE COURTS
The judicial tests described above present serious challenges to tribal
sovereignty, economic development and efficiency, and even common
sense. When courts intervene in topics beyond the judicial purview,
capacity, experience, and expertise, they create problems for other
branches of government, other governments, and the public to handle. Of
course, courts usually have the responsibility and power to decide the
cases and issues presented to them. But when federal and state courts
choose to address issues regarding tribal sovereign immunity and to set
standards that Indian nations must follow in creating, managing, and
operating their own business concerns, courts appear to be interfering into
the sovereign’s realm, the sovereign decisions of the legislative and
executive branches and actions of Indian nations, and beyond the
expertise, power, and proper role of courts and judges. In Part III, I
examine the contradictions and the costs imposed by these court decisions
on tribal economic development, efficiency, common sense, profitability,
and the long-term health of reservation communities.
In section B, I also briefly set out some initial thoughts on ways that
Indian nations and Congress might prevent federal and state courts from
interfering in decisions more properly reserved for Indian nations. The
U.S. Supreme Court has already pointed out one very valid suggestion, as
noted by the leading treatise in Federal Indian Law: “The Court has
consistently affirmed [tribal] immunity, deciding that Congress is the
appropriate body to determine whether to abrogate it, because Congress
is in a better position ‘to weigh and accommodate the competing policy
concerns and reliance interests.’”261
A.

Economic Efficiency, Common Sense, and Profitability

Under the tests described above, state and federal courts are mandating
that Indian nations engage in inefficient, unwise, unprofitable, and even
nonsensical methods of creating, managing, and operating their economic
entities if they are to benefit from their own inherent powers of
sovereignty and sovereign immunity. The only logical conclusion one can
take from these cases is that federal and state judiciaries are forcing Indian
nations to own, manage, and operate their economic concerns on a dayNative Tribal Health Consortium, 399 F. Supp. 3d 926 (D. Alaska 2019) (finding inter-tribal health
organization was an arm of the tribe and protected by immunity); Olson v. Nooksack, 6 N.I.C.S. App.
49, 52–53 (Nooksack Ct. App. 2001) (finding sovereign immunity protected tribal housing authority).
261. COHEN’S, supra note 31, at 637 & n.5 (emphasis added) (quoting Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Techs.,
Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 759 (1998)).
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to-day basis.262 But clearly, these judicial requirements are in direct
opposition to every normative economic principle and sound economic
advice that governments—especially tribal governments—have ever been
given about how best to create and operate publicly-owned economic
enterprises. Instead of actually controlling and operating these
commercial entities on a day-to-day basis, Indian nations have been
inundated with advice for many decades that they absolutely must
separate tribal politics, bureaucracies, and elected political leaders from
the day-to-day management and actual operations of their commercial
endeavors.263
Even worse, the 2020 Arizona Supreme Court case Hwal’Bay Ba, and
at least one earlier Arizona state case, stated that tribally owned
corporations and businesses should not purchase insurance to cover their
activities. According to those cases, if tribal governments have insurance
to protect the public from tribal economic activities, it cuts against an
Indian nation and its immunity protection because then the tribal nation is
protected from any risk of financial loss by the insurance policy.264 That
statement, and that reasoning, is simply unbelievable—to put it mildly.265
First, a tribal government or entity pays for insurance protection out of its
profits and investments, thus impacting the tribal treasury by decreasing
the income returning to the tribe and community. Second, the government
and entity will bear any increased insurance premium costs if claims
ensue. Those increased costs will also impact the tribal treasury. Third,
the tribe or entity might also be liable for damage claims that exceed the
policy limits if sovereign immunity does not protect the tribe or entity.
Fourth, no one, and especially not a government, would ever logically or
reasonably run a business or manage these affairs in such a fashion. These
Arizona courts were mistaken that buying insurance means there is no
possible impact on a tribal treasury because insurance expenses cost the
entity or tribe and lessen the profits that flow back to the Indian nation.
262. See Hwal’Bay Ba: J Enters. v. Jantzen in & for Mohave, 458 P.3d 102 (Ariz. 2020); People v.
Miami Nation Enters., 386 P.3d 357 (Cal. 2016); Sue/Perior Concrete & Paving, Inc. v. Lewiston
Golf Course Corp., 25 N.E.3d 928 (N.Y. 2014).
263. See infra notes 269–71 and accompanying text.
264. Hwal’Bay Ba, 458 P.3d at 109; Dixon v. Picopa Constr. Co., 772 P.2d 1104, 1109–10 (Ariz.
1989) (stating that tribal corporation that operates independently of the tribal government might not
qualify for immunity if it is not considered to be an arm of the tribe; tribal company had liability
insurance so the tribe itself was not at risk). Contra Graves v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 117
Ariz. 32 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977) (finding that the fact that the tribe purchased liability insurance did not
waive its governmental immunity).
265. Cf. Rutledge v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 660 F.2d 1345, 1349 (9th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (“[The
Board’s] funds are state funds. The fact that such funds may have been derived from insurance
proceeds does not alter this conclusion.”), abrogated by Haygood v. Younger, 769 F.2d 1350, 1356
(9th Cir. 1985).
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These courts also seem to have lost their way and common sense in
suggesting that a tribal government or entity must forego buying insurance
or else lose its sovereign rights.
In contrast to the nonsensical requirements that tribal governments
must own, manage, and operate their economic enterprises’ daily affairs
is the reality of well-respected economic principles that these judicially
imposed requirements absolutely contradict. It appears to be common
knowledge and common sense that politically directed and operated
business enterprises are inherently less efficient and less profitable than
privately operated entities. “Compared to a regular enterprise, stateowned enterprises are typically expected to be less efficient due to
political interference, [because] unlike profit-driven enterprises they are
more likely to focus on public objectives.”266 Economists also argue that
“state firms are typically extremely inefficient, and their losses result in
huge drains on their countries’ treasuries.”267 This is because politicians
and bureaucrats have very different goals than community social and
economic interests since politicians are driven by their own political
interests.268
Furthermore, these multi-factor judicial tests directly conflict with the
tribal-specific economic advice Indian nations have been receiving for
over thirty years. The well-known and well-respected Harvard Project on
American Indian Economic Development has been operating since 1987
and engages in extremely important research investigating the elements
that create successful Indian nations’ economic development.269 The
Project has engaged in over thirty years of scholarly economic studies,
masters theses and doctoral dissertations, and rigorous comparative
analyses to reach its conclusions. The Project has conclusively proven that
for tribal governmental businesses to survive, function, and generate longterm employment and tribal income, they must be kept as far away as
possible from the management and interference of politicians and direct
governmental control.270 As with almost all businesses, these entities
function best, survive longer, and are more profitable if they are operated
by—and day-to-day decisions are made by—experienced business people
who are as free as possible from the daily interventions, vicissitudes, and
266. State-owned
Enterprise,
WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stateowned_enterprise#cite_note-ShleiferVishny97-11 [https://perma.cc/G4ML-TED9]; see also Andrei
Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J. FIN. 737, 767 (1997).
267. Shleifer & Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, supra note 266, at 767.
268. Id. at 768.
269. About, HARV. PROJECT
[https://perma.cc/NC94-GTA5].

ON

A M.

INDIAN

ECON.

DEV.,

270. STATE OF THE NATIVE NATIONS, supra note 153, at 123 & n.26, 128.

https://hpaied.org/about
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intrigues of politics.271
The Harvard Project’s extensive studies since 1987 have firmly echoed
the truth of those principles for tribally owned commercial enterprises.
The Project’s comparative studies of over 100 Indian nations have proven
that tribal entities have a 400% better chance of being profitable,
successful, and sustainable if they keep politics and politicians out of their
daily management.272 Other Harvard Project studies reinforce that finding
because they have found in studying scores of tribes across the United
States that an independent tribal judicial system helps to keep political
influence out of economic decision-making and contract disputes, for
example, and leads to a 5% higher employment rate for reservations that
have independent judicial systems.273 Moreover, the Harvard Project has
also found that Indian nations that couple independent court systems with
a constitutional or statutory separation of powers provision enjoy an
overall 15% better employment rate than those tribal governments that
have not yet adopted those beneficial tools.274 These results demonstrate
that Indian nations should consider operating their economic concerns as
free from political control as possible. They also illustrate that the multifactor judicial tests undercut the ability of Indian nations to contribute to
the sustainability and future of their reservation communities.
The Harvard Project is also well known for three core conclusions that
it has proven lead to successful and sustained tribal economic
development. Two of those findings are directly relevant to our
discussion. First, the Project has proven through its extensive studies that
there is an important role for tribal governments in creating successful
reservation economic development. Tribal sovereignty matters. Tribal
leaders and Indian nations must set the overall strategic direction and must
make the big decisions on what economic endeavors will be pursued by a
tribal nation.275 This is especially important in light of the fact that tribal
governments are often the beneficial owners, along with the United States
as the legal owner, of the majority of lands and natural resources and
assets on most reservations. Tribal leaders are obligated and entrusted to
make those kinds of higher-level decisions, and they are plainly the best
qualified to make decisions that impact the overall development and use
of a reservation, the community, and their assets. The Harvard Project has
271. Id. at 123–128; Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Politicians and Firms, 109 Q.J. ECON.
995, 996 (1994) (citing authorities).
272. STATE OF THE NATIVE NATIONS, supra note 153, at 123 & n.26.
273. Id. at 128; Stephen Cornell & Joseph P. Kalt, Where’s the Glue? Institutional and Cultural
Foundations of American Indian Economic Development, 29 J. SOCIO-ECON. 443, 458–61 (2000).
274. STATE OF THE NATIVE NATIONS, supra note 153, at 128.
275. Id. at 126–28.
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also proven that tribal governments and politicians have to be kept out of
day-to-day business management and operations: the tactics of running an
economic entity. According to its studies and findings, tribal governments
must separate politics from the day-to-day operations of tribally owned
businesses to ensure their profitability and sustainability.276
The Project’s next finding is that tribal institutions, including court
systems, departments, and bureaucracies, are crucial in impacting
economic decision-making and operations and economic development on
reservations.277 For the benefit of both public and private economic
sectors, tribal institutions must be efficient, competent, fair, and even
“business-friendly” to attract and support the success of business activities
in Indian Country.278 The Project’s third finding is perhaps less relevant
to this Article. The Project has proven that tribal cultures also matter in
successful Indian nation economic development.279 This finding seems
fairly obvious because a reservation culture or community that totally
rejects a certain type of business activity is not going to tolerate or support
a tribal or privately owned business whose operations and sheer existence
violate tribal and community norms.
The Harvard Project has long made explicit suggestions to tribal
governments to consider how best to benefit from its studies and findings
and how to institute lasting economic development. The Project and its
studies strongly recommend that Indian nations appoint non-elected
leaders and experienced and independent boards of directors to control
and manage tribal commercial entities, and that they hire business experts,
Native or non-Native, to operate the departments and companies a tribal
government creates to develop reservation assets and opportunities.280
Note that these studies and the Harvard Project’s recommendations are
the exact opposite of what the state and federal cases set out above are
requiring of tribal governments. In contrast, those courts are demanding
that elected tribal leaders sit on the boards of their corporate and business
entities and actively manage and even control daily business operations
and decision-making. There seems to be no other way to view these
judicial tests than as mandating economically inefficient and ultimately
disastrous requirements on Indian nations when they create
276. Id. at 123, 128.
277. Id. at 122–25.
278. MILLER, RESERVATION “CAPITALISM,” supra note 2, at 108–09; accord Miller, Sovereign
Resilience, 2018 BYU L. REV., supra note 5, at 1382 (“[B]usinesses and entrepreneurs are attracted
to locations where the branches of government are competent and can assist businesses to locate,
operate, and profit.”); STATE OF THE NATIVE NATIONS, supra note 153, at 123–25.
279. STATE OF THE NATIVE NATIONS, supra note 153, at 125–26.
280. Id. at 123, 128.
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governmentally owned economic endeavors.
Furthermore, these state and federal tests impose conditions on Indian
nations that imperil the profitability and thus the very sustainability of the
business enterprises and the sustainability of reservation communities
themselves. Most tribal governments and reservation communities suffer
from extreme poverty and from many deficits and obstacles for operating
successful and sustainable economic concerns. Most Indian reservations
are located in remote and rural areas, lack physical, social, health, and
educational infrastructures, suffer from a nearly complete lack of a tax
base, lack financial and human capital, and face other issues that present
serious challenges for any tribal nations’ business and reservation to
survive and thrive.281 Tribal governments and Indian Country need
successful and sustainable economic activities and they need every benefit
and advantage that is available to them as sovereign entities, including the
protection of sovereign immunity.282
In sum, federal and state court interference into tribal economic affairs
is problematic and very detrimental for Indigenous economic
development and efforts to improve living conditions in Indian Country.
The next section lays out some preliminary thoughts on how Indian
nations and Congress might work to successfully repel this judicial
overreach.
B.

Tribal Sovereignty Versus the Courts

The judicial tests discussed above arguably constitute inappropriate
and improper judicial overreach into the prerogatives of tribal
governments. In this section, I briefly set out four arguments that might
counter the judicial activism that has been underway for the past few
decades as state and federal courts forced inefficient and unwise
requirements on tribal governments. These arguments will be developed
more fully in future articles.
My first point is that the U.S. Supreme Court has already demonstrated
the correct approach that state and federal courts should take before even
considering delving into, never mind imposing requirements on, tribal
sovereign immunity. In 1998 and 2014, the Court demonstrated judicial
modesty, self-restraint, and the proper role for courts before engaging

281. Supra notes 1–3; RESERVATION “CAPITALISM”, supra note 2, at 118–20, 123, 144.
282. Min Zhang v. Grand Canyon Resort Corp., No. 5:19-cv-00124-SVW-SP, 2020 WL 1000608,
at *2 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 2020) (stating “as one of its purposes is to provide economic opportunities
to Tribe members, GCRC’s continued operation directly benefits the tribe by employing its
members”); see, e.g., Morgan, supra note 153, at 122, 124, 126, 128, 130 (stating tribal businesses are
helped to succeed by being “shielded from a lawsuit by sovereign immunity”).
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these tribal issues. In 1998, in Kiowa Tribe,283 and 2014 in Bay Mills,284
the Court rejected the very arguments that the lower courts and the multifactor tests described above have now adopted: whether courts can limit
tribal sovereign immunity. In contrast, the Supreme Court took a totally
different approach and left tribal immunity decisions to the appropriate
and constitutionally mandated branch of the federal government to decide
these issues: Congress.285
In Kiowa Tribe, a 6-3 opinion, the Court at first took a relatively dim
view of tribal immunity and criticized how its own case law on the topic
had “developed almost by accident.”286 The Court said there “are reasons
to doubt the wisdom of perpetuating the doctrine.”287 In this case, the
Kiowa Tribe in Oklahoma engaged in economic activities and conduct
that occurred outside of Indian Country. But the Court rejected the
invitation to intrude on the well-recognized parameters of tribal
sovereignty and immunity. The Court did so because, as I have noted
several times, the Constitution places the primary federal role for dealing
with Indian nations, peoples, and tribal affairs in the hands of Congress.
In earlier cases, the Court had already adopted the practice of deferring to
Congress on questions of tribal immunity, and “Congress had failed to
abrogate it in order to promote economic development and tribal selfsufficiency.”288 Note that the plaintiff in Kiowa Tribe did not ask the Court
to “repudiate the principle outright, but suggest[ed] instead that we
confine it to reservations or to noncommercial activities.”289 However, the
Court again relied on Congress’ preeminence and stated that it would
283. Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751 (1998).
284. Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782 (2014).
285. Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 756 (stating “tribal [sovereign] immunity is a matter of federal law
and is not subject to diminution by the States”); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58
(1978) (stating tribal immunity “is subject to the superior and plenary control of Congress” and Indian
Nations are exempt from suit without congressional authorization); Larson v. Domestic & Foreign
Com. Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 704 (1949) (noting it is the function of Congress, not the Supreme Court,
to determine the immunity of a particular government agency); Fed. Hous. Admin. v. Burr, 309 U.S.
242, 245 (1940) (noting Congress determines whether governmental agencies and corporations have
sovereign immunity); Allen v. Gold Country Casino, 464 F.3d 1044, 1047–48 (9th Cir. 2006), cert.
denied, 549 U.S. 1231 (2007) (“[T]he breadth of [tribal] sovereign immunity in the absence of
congressional action[] [retains its full force] because Congress has not limited the immunity of Indian
tribes.”).
286. Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 756. Commentators have disputed that characterization. See
generally Wood, supra note 97. Professor Skibine calls these statements of the Court dicta. Alex
Tallchief Skibine, From Foundational Law to Limiting Principles in Federal Indian Law, 80 MONT.
L. REV. 67, 76 (2019).
287. Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 758; see also Bay Mills, 572 U.S. at 815 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
288. Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 757 (citing Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian
Tribe, 498 U.S. 505, 510 (1991)).
289. Id. at 758.
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follow Congress’ lead. “Congress has acted against the background of our
decisions. It has restricted tribal immunity from suit in limited
circumstances. And in other statutes it has declared an intention not to
alter it.”290 The Court noted that Congress has the authority to alter tribal
immunity and even change Supreme Court case law on the subject, as the
Court had held for many decades.291 In fact, the Court expressly
recognized that Congress is the branch of the federal government with that
authority, and that it is in a much better position to make such decisions
than is the judicial branch: “Congress is in a position to weigh and
accommodate the competing policy concerns and reliance interests. The
capacity of the Legislative Branch to address the issue by comprehensive
legislation counsels some caution by us in this area.”292 Thus, the Court
“cho[se] to defer to Congress” and left it up to that branch whether to
enact legislation to limit tribal immunity for off-reservation commercial
activities.293
Sixteen years later, in Bay Mills, the Court was again faced with the
question whether it should intrude and limit tribal sovereign immunity, or
if it would continue to leave those decisions up to Congress.294
Interestingly, Justice Scalia changed his position from 1998 in Kiowa
Tribe and became convinced that decision was wrongly decided. Thus, he
joined the dissent that would have taken up the issue and maybe altered
the Court’s precedent on tribal immunity.295 Notwithstanding that change,
a 5-4 decision, the Court continued to rely on Congress and leave it to that
branch to consider and perhaps enact any changes.296 The Court continued
to show self-restraint in not considering reversing or modifying Kiowa
Tribe or tribal immunity. The Bay Mills Court stated: “it is fundamentally
Congress’s job, not ours, to determine whether or how to limit tribal
290. Id. (citations omitted).
291. Id. at 759.
292. Id. (emphasis added). Cf. Adam Crepelle, Tribal Lending and Tribal Sovereignty, 66 DRAKE
L. REV. 1, 35 (2018) (“Congress should take action to solve the tribal lending controversy because
courts are not well-suited for policymaking.”).
293. Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 760. The Supreme Court has recognized in regards to the Federal
Tort Claims Act that Congress preserved sovereign immunity for federal discretionary functions
because “Congress wished to prevent judicial ‘second-guessing’ of legislative and administrative
decisions grounded in social, economic, and political policy through the medium of an action in tort.”
United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense, 467 U.S. 797, 814 (1984). This
justification seems to apply equally for keeping federal and state courts out of tribal executive and
legislative branch decisions.
294. Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782 (2014).
295. Id. at 814.
296. Id. at 799 (“Congress exercises primary authority in this area and ‘remains free to alter what
we have done’ —another factor that gives ‘special force’ to stare decisis.” (quoting Patterson v.
McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172–73 (1989))).
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immunity.”297 The majority added: “All that we said in Kiowa applies
today, with yet one more thing: Congress has now reflected on Kiowa and
made an initial (though of course not irrevocable) decision to retain that
form of tribal immunity.”298
The Court noted that after its invitation in Kiowa Tribe, sixteen years
earlier, for Congress to address the subject of tribal immunity, Congress
had done so. Crucially, even though Congress then considered several
bills to “modify tribal immunity in the commercial context,” and two of
the bills even expressly referred to reversing Kiowa Tribe, Congress chose
instead “to enact a far more modest alternative” and simply require Indian
nations to either disclose the existence of or to waive their immunity in
certain contracts.299 So now the Bay Mills Court stated “rather than
confronting, as we did in Kiowa, a legislative vacuum as to the precise
issue presented, we act today against the backdrop of a congressional
choice: to retain tribal immunity . . . . Reversing Kiowa in these
circumstances would scale the heights of presumption.”300 In sum, state
courts and the lower federal courts should emulate the Supreme Court’s
restraint and judicial modesty and not consider issues of tribal immunity.
This topic is the province of Congress. The Kiowa Tribe and Bay Mills
Courts refused to render decisions or even consider imposing mandates
for how Indian nations should exercise their sovereign rights. The Court
left those decisions to Congress and its proper constitutional role and its
ability to hold hearings, debate public policies, and legislate on Indian law
issues.
My second point concerns “Our Federalism” and the proper role of
state and lower federal courts in Indian affairs.301 When the Supreme
Court first used this phrase it was surely thinking only of the relations and
respect due between the federal and state governments. But there is no
question that the Constitution recognizes three different governmental
entities within the United States: the Indian nations, the states, and the
national government. “Our Federalism” properly includes Indian nations.
So, the respect or comity that is owed between governments encompassed
within “Our Federalism” should also exist between state, tribal, and
federal courts. Consequently, state and lower federal courts should apply
a well-known principle of federal jurisprudence and respect tribal
297. Id. at 800.
298. Id. at 801.
299. Id. at 801–02; see also 25 U.S.C. § 81 (amended 2000).
300. Bay Mills, 572 U.S. at 802–03 (emphasis added).
301. See Hale v. Bimco Trading, 306 U.S. 375, 378 (1939). This was apparently the first use by the
Supreme Court of the phrase that became “Our Federalism.” Michael G. Collins, Whose Federalism?,
9 CONST. COMMENT. 75, 75–76 (1992).

Miller (Do Not Delete)

830

11/2/22 10:49 PM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 97:775

governments and courts by requiring plaintiffs to exhaust their tribal court
remedies and litigate issues like sovereign immunity in tribal courts before
state or federal courts hear such cases.302
My second argument also arises naturally from a “‘prudential,’ not
jurisdictional” exhaustion rule303 that the Supreme Court began imposing
on litigants suing Indian nations in federal courts beginning in 1985 and
1987. In National Farmers Union304 and Iowa Mutual305 the Court applied
the principles of comity and respect due between governments to tribal
governments and tribal judicial systems and began requiring parties to
address questions about a tribal court’s jurisdiction over them to tribal
courts first before commencing litigation in federal courts.306 Only after
the parties have exhausted their tribal court remedies can they proceed in
federal court.307 Even then, however, parties do not get to re-litigate a case
that was fully heard in a tribal court if the federal district judge agrees
with the tribal court that it possessed jurisdiction over those parties and
those claims.308 In that situation, the federal court case is simply
dismissed.309
I am simply asking whether the proper application of comity and
respect for tribal governments and courts, and “Our Federalism,” should
require state courts to also make parties litigate issues of tribal sovereign
immunity first in the appropriate tribal court before proceeding, if at all,
in a state court. And perhaps federal courts should expand their use of
National Farmers Union and Iowa Mutual to require the same of parties
in federal court litigation who raise issues concerning tribal immunity.
Perhaps the same U.S. Supreme Court analysis and comity rule set out in
Kiowa Tribe and Bay Mills could be expanded to require lower federal
courts to force litigants to first present and exhaust their sovereign
immunity arguments in tribal courts? In addition, perhaps state and tribal
302. See infra notes 302–03 and accompanying text. Cf. Elengold & Glater, The Sovereign in
Commerce, supra note 47, at 1118–21 (arguing that Federalism between state and federal
governments is implicated when private contractors use federal sovereign immunity).
303. Strate v. A-1 Contractors, Inc., 520 U.S. 438, 451 (1997).
304. Nat’l Farmers Union v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
305. Iowa Mut. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987).
306. Id. at 16 (“[R]espect for tribal legal institutions requires that they be given a ‘full opportunity’
to consider the issues before them and to ‘rectify any errors.’”); Nat’l Farmers Union, 471 U.S. at
855–57; accord Norton v. Ute Indian Tribe, 862 F.3d 1236, 1243 (10th Cir. 2017).
307. Cayuga Nation v. Parker, No. 5:22-cv-00128, 2022 WL 1813882, at *12 (N.D.N.Y. June 2,
2022).
308. COHEN’S, supra note 31, at 620 (citing Iowa Mut., 480 U.S. at 19).
309. See, e.g., First Specialty Ins. Corp. v. Confederated Tribes of the Grand Ronde Cmty., No. 0705-KI, 2007 WL 3283699, at *5 (D. Or. Nov. 2, 2007) (granting comity to the tribal court decision in
First Specialty Ins. Corp. v. Confederated Tribes of the Grand Ronde Cmty., No. A-05-09-001, at *1,
*16–21 (Grand Ronde Ct. App. Oct 31, 2006).

Miller (Do Not Delete)

2022]

11/2/22 10:49 PM

TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY AND EFFICIENCY

831

governments could consider enacting something like the existing state
certification statutes that allow state supreme courts to hear questions of
state law that are referred to them from federal courts. Tribal governments
could require their courts to accept certified questions on Indian law
questions, and sovereign immunity issues, from federal and state court
systems.310
My third suggestion is that Indian nations could consider lobbying
Congress for an act to prevent state and even federal courts from
addressing or attempting to limit tribal sovereign rights. Such a law would
be a powerful protective step for Indian nations and their rights. The
Supreme Court has long held pursuant to the Interstate/Indian Commerce
Clause that state governments have no role at all in Indian affairs and
policies.311 The Supreme Court has also held that Congress is all powerful
over the other branches of the federal government in Indian affairs.312
There are analogous and relevant examples in current acts of Congress
for what I am suggesting. In 1968, Congress enacted the Indian Civil
Rights Act,313 and required Indian nations to extend to their own citizens
and all persons “within its jurisdiction” most of the protections of the Bill
of Rights and some other provisions of the U.S. Constitution.314 But
Congress did not expressly create a federal cause of action under ICRA
for aggrieved parties to sue tribal governments in federal courts. Lower
federal courts began implying a cause of action in the ICRA and began
hearing ICRA cases versus Indian nations.315 But in 1978 the Supreme
Court stopped that improper judicial conduct. Since ICRA did not
expressly waive tribal sovereign immunity to federal courts, or expressly
create a federal cause of action, such claims could not be heard in federal
courts.316 In addition, Congress enacted the Indian Child Welfare Act in
310. See, e.g., Bennett Evan Cooper, Certification of Questions of Law to State Supreme Courts,
REUTERS (June 22, 2021), https://www.reuters.com/legal/legalindustry/certification-questions-lawstate-supreme-courts-2021-06-22/ [https://perma.cc/K592-QD27] (stating that forty-nine states have
enacted certification statutes and some allow state courts to certify legal questions to tribal courts).
The federal government has already enacted an analogous statute that respects state sovereignty and
requires a federal court to notify the state attorney general, and allow the state to intervene, when a
federal case calls into question the constitutionality of a state law. 28 U.S.C. § 2403(b). Congress
could amend this statute to require federal courts to do the same when they are considering questions
about tribal sovereignty or sovereign immunity.
311. E.g. U.S. CONST. art. I. § 8, cl. 3; Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 788
(2014) (“[T]ribes are subject to plenary control by Congress.”); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.)
515, 561 (1832) (“[State] laws . . . can have no force” in Indian Country.).
312. E.g. Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 191–92 (1989).
313. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1303.
314. Id. § 1302.
315. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 61–62 (1978).
316. Id. at 69–70.
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1978,317 and granted tribal courts exclusive jurisdiction over state courts
in foster care and adoption cases for Indian children who are domiciled on
a reservation.318 Congress further mandated that even for Indian children
who are domiciled off a reservation that state courts should transfer those
cases to tribal courts unless there is “good cause to the contrary.”319 In
light of just these two examples, convincing Congress to enact a law
preventing state and even federal courts from hearing certain cases
regarding tribal immunity and tribal economic affairs is not an outlandish
suggestion.
My fourth suggestion also concerns an act of Congress. It appears that
Congress could enact a removal type statute motivated by the same comity
and respect issues as demonstrated in National Farmers Union. Under the
current federal removal statutes, defendants sued in state courts are
allowed to remove cases raising federal law issues to federal courts.320 But
Congress has mandated that certain categories of cases cannot be removed
to federal courts at all.321 Obviously, Congress thought it was justified for
valid policy reasons to force such cases to be heard only in state courts.
Perhaps Congress could be convinced that there are equally valid policy
justifications to keep tribal sovereign immunity issues out of state courts.
In addition, once such cases were in federal courts, or were filed there
initially, perhaps National Farmers Union, or Congress itself, would
require federal courts to force the parties to exhaust their tribal court
remedies first and address questions regarding sovereign immunity to the
proper tribal court. If Congress considered such a bill, it would be
pursuing the same comity and respect ideas that motivated the Supreme
Court rulings in National Farmers Union and Iowa Mutual. If Congress
does not adopt the later provision, perhaps the Supreme Court could be
convinced to extend its case law and require the same as a matter of
common law.
These preliminary ideas appear to be viable starting points for Indian
nations and Congress to begin resisting what I have defined as judicial
overreach and state and federal court intrusions into the purview of the
federal legislative branch and into the executive and legislative branch

317. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1923.
318. Id. § 1911(a). ICWA is currently being challenged on constitutional grounds by several states
in Brackeen v. Haaland, 994 F.3d 249 (5th Cir. 2021) (en banc), cert. granted, __ U.S. __, 142 S. Ct.
1205 (Feb. 28, 2022).
319. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b).
320. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441–1443.
321. Id. § 1445.
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decisions of Indian nations.322 Further research and debate on these topics
will help flesh out these and perhaps other valid strategies.
There is no question that federal and state court decisions are
intentionally or incidentally forcing tribal governments to operate their
business concerns, and even their governmental departments,
inefficiently, unprofitably, and in violation of solid economic principles.
The state and federal courts are intruding on Congress’ authority,
congressional Indian policies, and Supreme Court precedent in not
respecting and granting comity to Indian nations’ sovereign decisions and
their inherent powers of sovereign immunity. State courts have arguably
vastly exceeded their constitutional and proper roles by intruding into
areas of federal Indian law and Indian nations’ sovereign decisions.
Courts possess no particular expertise or proper role in reviewing the
economic development policies and decisions of Indian nations and
enacting policies that infringe on tribal rights. These courts should
exercise proper judicial modesty and get out of the “business” of
mandating how tribal legislative and executive branches create, manage,
and operate their governmental departments, bureaucracies, and economic
entities.
CONCLUSION
Today, 574 federally recognized Indian nations govern themselves and
their territories pursuant to long established tribal and federal law
principles. Prominent among those legal rules are that Indian nations are
governments that possess and exercise inherent sovereign rights and
powers. One of those important rights is to be as free as possible from
federal control, and to be completely free of state infringements on tribal
sovereignty. Sovereignty includes the right of sovereign immunity.
Consequently, Indian nations are almost totally protected by immunity
from being sued in federal, state, or tribal courts without their express
consent.
Indian nations have also long used their sovereign powers to engage in
a multitude of tribally owned business and economic endeavors to try to
rid themselves and their communities of the pernicious effects of endemic
poverty. Tribal sovereignty, the history of federal and tribal legal
principles supporting that sovereignty, and sovereign immunity, should
prevent states, state law, and state and federal judicial incursions into
tribal executive and legislative branch economic decisions and operations.
In contrast, though, federal and state judges have intervened into the field
322. See, e.g., Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 754–58 (1998) (stating that
sovereign immunity is necessary to protect tribes from state invasions of their jurisdiction).
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of tribal sovereign authority, and interfered with tribal economic
efficiency, profitability, federal Indian policies, and even with common
sense. These courts appear to have acted beyond the proper judicial role
and have mandated how tribal executive and legislative branches must
create, control, and manage their economic operations. “The policy of
leaving Indians free from state jurisdiction and control is deeply rooted in
the Nation’s history.”323 Consequently, instead of being mandated to and
ordered about, Indian nations should be the only entities authorized, and
they are obviously the best suited in the United States political system, to
determine how best to serve the economic goals of Indian Country,
economic efficiency, and the needs of Indian Country.
Indian nations should resist this judicial overreach just as they have
battled for centuries against federal and state incursions into tribal
sovereignty. Political strategies and legal arguments need to be developed
to keep state and federal courts out of decision-making about the best and
most efficient ways for tribal economic development to proceed and how
best to operate tribal economic entities. Indian nations, tribal
governments, and tribal courts are best suited to undertake these tasks and
they must be the governmental entities that deal with these critical issues
and needs in the future.

323. Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786, 789 (1945).

